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IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE
Ronen Perryf
"It's a Wonderful Life," the title of Frank Capra 's classic 1946 movie,
seems to encapsulate a fundamental all-American conviction. Unsurpris-
ingly, several courts and jurists have applied the movie-title maxim as the
ultimate retort to one of the most intriguing questions in modern tort dis-
course: Is it possible to say that a severely disabled child has been harmed by
the mere fact of being born? Wrongful lfe claimants answer in the affirma-
tive, whereas Capra 's aphorism makes a compelling counterargument. In my
opinion, the contrasting views represent equally legitimate subjective beliefs
rather than objective truths, so neither may ever prevail. Without a satisfac-
tory solution from conventional wisdom, the life-as-injuy debate may be the
Gordian knot of tort law. The purpose of this Article is to cut, rather than
untie, the knot: Allow the child to recover without challenging or validating
the deep-seated perception of lfe.
Part I shows that hostility to liability in tort for wrongful life is almost
universal, crossing lands and seas. Part II argues that this demurral is
ultimately rooted in the absence of one of the central components of the cause
of action. A tort action must fail because of the inability-both logical and
practical-to establish "harm" under the traditional definition of this term.
Part III opines that because the Gordian knot of tort law cannot be untied, it
must be cut altogether. We must replace the traditional tort framework,
which gives rise to an insoluble problem, with a more promising contractual
framework inspired by the celebrated case of Hawkins v. McGee. In my view,
the child may base an action on the claim that the defendant promised the
parents that the child would be born without a certain defect and that the
promise went unfulfilled. In formal terms, the child is an intended third-
party beneficiary of the contract between the parents and the consultant in
which the latter warranted birth without a particular disability. The war-
ranty of the future child's physical integrity and health, an integral and
inseparable part of the contract, should form the basis of the child's cause of
action.
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INTRODUCTION
The title of Frank Capra's classic 1946 movie seems to encapsu-
late a fundamental all-American conviction.1 Unsurprisingly, several
1 IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946).
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courts and jurists have applied the movie-title maxim as the ultimate
retort to one of the most intriguing questions in modern tort dis-
course: Is it possible to say that a severely disabled child has been
harmed by the mere fact of being born? Wrongful life claimants an-
swer in the affirmative, whereas Capra's aphorism makes a compelling
counterargument. In my opinion, the contrasting views represent
equally legitimate subjective beliefs rather than objective truths, so
neither may ever prevail. Without a satisfactory solution from conven-
tional wisdom, the life-as-injury debate may be the Gordian knot of
tort law. The purpose of this Article is to cut, rather than untie, the
knot: Allow the child to recover without challenging or validating the
deep-seated perception of life.
A wrongful life action is a tort action of a disabled child against
the person whose negligence enabled the child's birth.2 The defen-
dant may be a genetic consultant, a doctor, or a medical institution
(hereinafter "the consultant") who failed to reveal the risk of congeni-
tal disability under circumstances where knowledge of the risk would
have induced the mother to avoid conception or to terminate preg-
nancy. The defendant may also be a consultant who negligently per-
formed a procedure aimed at preventing the conception or birth of
the child under circumstances that portended the risk of birth
defects.3
Two assumptions premise a wrongful life action. On the one
hand, the consultant's negligence did not cause the impairment. It
may have derived from a variety of sources, inter alia, a chromosomal
aberration such as a missing, superfluous, or defective chromosome;4
heredity;5 fetal exposure to dangerous factors not imputable to the
consultant: mechanical 6 (e.g., a knock), biological7 (e.g., embryonic
infection by microorganisms or viruses), chemical" (e.g., toxic sub-
2 See Michael A. Berenson, Comment, The Wrongful Life Claim-The Legal Dilemma of
Existence Versus Nonexistence: "To Be or Not to Be," 64 TUL. L. REv. 895, 895-96 (1990) (dis-
cussing the various forms that causes of action can take in wrongful life claims).
3 Id. at 895-97.
4 The most frequent chromosomal aberration is Down syndrome. SeeJ.L. Tolmie,
Chromosomal Disorders, in PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS IN OBSTETRIC PRACTICE 33, 35-41 (M.J. Whit-
tie &J.M. Connor eds., 2d ed. 1989).
5 Sickle cell disease, Tay-Sachs disease, and thalassaemia are examples of genetic dis-
eases. SeeJ.M. Connor, Genetic Assessment and Counseling, in PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS IN OBSTET-
RIC PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 1, 3.
6 See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 618 (Cal. 1970), superseded by statute,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1999), as recognized in People v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881 (Cal.
2004) (analyzing the intentional attack on a pregnant woman's womb under the California
statute defining murder).
7 See A.A.M. Gibson & W.J.A. Patrick, Fetal Pathology, in PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS IN OB-
STETRIC PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 176, 195.
8 See, e.g., M.J. Whittle & P.C. Rubin, Exposure to Teratogens, in PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS IN
OBSTETRIC PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 161, 161 (noting the impact of the thalidomide disas-
ter on views regarding drug ingestion during pregnancy).
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stances, hormones, or medicines given to the mother), or physical
(e.g., exposure to excessive heat or radiation); pathological distur-
bance to the pregnant woman's amniotic sac, hindering the supply of
nutrition and oxygen to the fetus;9 or a combination of factors.
On the other hand, absent negligence, the plaintiff would not
have been born at all-conception would not have occurred or preg-
nancy would have been terminated. The defendant's negligence is
manifested in one of the following: (1) failure to reveal the risk of a
congenital disability or failure to properly report it prior to concep-
tion, primarily within the framework of genetic counseling;10 (2) fail-
ure to reveal the risk or failure to properly report it within the
framework of medical tests conducted during the pregnancy (e.g.,
amniocentesis" or ultrasonography 2) or in light of information re-
ceived regarding the pregnant woman's exposure to deleterious fac-
tors (e.g., rubella 13) or medication endangering the fetus; 14 or (3)
negligent performance of an abortion 15 or a contraceptive proce-
dure 16 where there is a real risk of a child being born disabled.
Courts generally classify actions brought under these circum-
stances according to the plaintiff's identity-the parents' action and
the child's action. The parents' action is generally referred to as a
"wrongful birth" action. 17 The parents claim that the consultant's
negligence has forced them to shoulder the unanticipated costs of car-
9 See, e.g., D.A. Aitken & M. Rae, Biochemical Diagnosis of Inborn Errors of Metabolism, in
PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS IN OBSTETRIC PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 115, 117-18 (discussing diag-
nosis of metabolic disorders via amniotic fluid analysis).
10 See Curlender ex rel. Curlender v. Bio-Sci. Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 480 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980) (entertaining a claim by plaintiffs who sued a laboratory hired to help deter-
mine potential risks of genetic defect in their offspring); Park v. Chessin, 386 N.E.2d 807,
809 (N.Y. 1978) (entertaining a claim by plaintiffs who sued doctors for supplying bad
advice regarding potential genetic defects); Connor, supra note 5, at 6.
11 See, e.g., Azzolino ex rel. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 530 (N.C. 1985)
(entertaining a claim by a plaintiff who sued doctors for not informing her of the existence
of the test); see also Alquijay v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp., 473 N.E.2d 244, 245 (N.Y. 1984)
(entertaining a claim for negligent application of the amniocentesis test).
12 See, e.g., Mickle v. Salvation Army Grace Hosp., [1998] 166 D.L.R.4th 743, 749
(Can.).
13 E.g., Blake ex rel. Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 316-17 (Idaho 1984), superseded by
statute, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-334 (West 2004), as recognized in Vanvooren v. Astin, 111 P.3d
125 (Idaho 2005); Smith ex rel. Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 342-43 (N.H. 1986); Procanik
v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 757 (N.J. 1984), rev'd, 543 A.2d 985 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988);
Gleitman ex rel. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 690-91 (N.J. 1967), abrogated by
Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372,
373-74 (Wis. 1975).
14 See, e.g., Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Wash. 1983) (plain-
tiffs alleged that the prescription of Dilantin caused "fetal hydantoin syndrome").
15 E.g., Speck ex rel. Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 113 (Pa. 1981), superseded by
statute, 42 PA. CONS. STAr. ANN. § 8305 (West 2007).
16 Eg., Edwards v. Blomeley (2002) N.S.W.S.C. 460 (Austl.), available at http://www.
austlii.edu.au/ au/ cases/ nsw/supreme-ct/ 2002/460.h tml.
17 Berenson, supra note 2, at 898-99.
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ing for an abnormal child and that the child's birth in a defective state
wrought them emotional harm.' 8 The child's claim is for "wrongful
life" 9 and is the focus of this Article.
Assuming both are actionable grounds, three differences separate
wrongful life from wrongful birth. First, the parents cannot bring suit
in their own name for the child's nonpecuniary damage (pain and
suffering) .20 Second, only the child can claim damages for the cost of
special treatment mandated by the disability when the law no longer
expects the parents to bear these costs, for example, after the child
reaches majority or following the parents' death. 2' Third, the limita-
tion period for the child's claim tolls until majority, allowing the child
to bring a claim long after the parents' claim has expired. 22
For the purposes of this Article, I distinguish between two catego-
ries of cases. The first comprises cases in which a woman, either alone
or with her spouse, decides to conceive or give birth in reliance on the
defendant's representation that her child will be born without de-
fect.23 As the child is born disabled, it transpires that the defendant's
representation was negligent. 24 These cases assume that the woman
would have refrained from giving birth but for the negligence. 25 In
this category, we may further distinguish between negligence before
and after conception. For example, assume that prospective parents
attempt to conceive, relying on genetic consultation that allays the
fear of a prospective child suffering from a congenital defect. 26 It
transpires that the consultant was negligent and a disabled child is
born. 27 In this case, negligence precedes conception. 28 Now assume
18 See Speck, 439 A.2d at 113-14 (recognizing causes of action for emotional distress
under governing principles of tort law).
19 Berenson, supra note 2, at 897.
20 See Alan J. Belsky, Injury as a Matter of Law: Is This the Answer to the Wrongful Life
Dilemma?, 22 U. BALT. L. REV. 185, 190 (1993) (explaining that parents of plaintiffs who
bring wrongful life claims bring "wrongful birth" claims on different bases of liability).
21 See id. at 204. Note, however, that in certain jurisdictions the parents are obliged to
support their children as long as the children are incapable of supporting themselves. See,
e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3910(a) (1994). This is also the case in Germany. See Basil
Markesinis, Reading Through a ForeignJudgment, in THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS IN CELE-
BRATION OF JOHN FLEMING 261, 269 n.35 (Peter Cane &Jane Stapleton eds., 1998) ("[I]n
German law the obligation of maintenance continues for life and does not, as in many
American jurisdictions, come to an end upon the child attaining majority.").
22 See, e.g., Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 764 (N.J. 1984), rev'd, 543 A.2d 985 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (allowing the child's claim brought after the parents' claim had
expired).
23 E.g., Blake ex rel. Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 316 (Idaho 1984), superseded by statute,
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-334 (West 2004), as recognized in Vanvooren v. Astin, 111 P.3d 125
(Idaho 2005).
24 See id.
25 See id. at 255.
26 See, e.g., Park v. Chessin, 386 N.E.2d 807, 809 (N.Y. 1978).
27 See, e.g., id.
28 See, e.g., id.
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that a pregnant woman contracted rubella and was unaware of the
danger to the embryo due to the family doctor's negligent misdiagno-
sis.29 Out of ignorance, she decided to give birth to a child who suf-
fered from defects stemming from her illness.30 This is a case of
postconception negligence. 3'
The second category comprises cases where the parents, aware of
the risk of congenital disability, intended to avoid conception or birth
yet the defendant negligently performed an act intended to prevent
conception (e.g., supplying effective contraceptives) or an abortion.
As in the first category, the defendant's negligence brought about the
birth of a child who could not have been born without a defect, not
the defect itself. The main difference is that the defendant's negli-
gence in this second category manifests in a substandard act rather
than in a misrepresentation.
Speck v. Finegold was a case of this kind. 32 Mr. Speck suffered from
a grave hereditary disorder (neurofibromatosis). 33 Following the
birth of two daughters suffering from the same disease, he and his
wife decided to avoid having more children. 34 Mr. Speck requested
that Dr. Finegold perform a vasectomy, and the doctor subsequently
informed Mr. Speck that the operation succeeded. Nonetheless, Mrs.
Speck conceived a short time later.35 The couple approached Dr.
Schwartz and asked him to perform an abortion.36 Dr. Schwartz in-
formed Mrs. Speck that he had performed the abortion successfully,
but once again there had been medical negligence, and she gave birth
to a girl suffering from the same disease. 37 The parents brought an
action against the negligent doctors in their own names and in their
daughter's name.38 The trial court rejected the child's suit.39
Although the two categories are practically identical from a tort-
law perspective, the distinction between them is of major importance
in this Article. My central thesis concerns only the first category. The
alternative conceptual framework proposed herein cannot overcome
the difficulty raised by cases belonging to the second category.
29 See, e.g., Blake, 698 P.2d at 316 (entertaining a lawsuit for plaintiff whose doctor
failed to test properly for rubella).
30 See, e.g., id.
31 See, e.g., id.
32 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981); see also Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 547 (Ala. 1978)
(considering a failed vasectomy).
33 Speck, 439 A.2d at 112.
34 Id. at 112-13.
35 Id. at 113.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 112.
39 Id. at 113.
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Having adequately clarified the factual background of wrongful
life claims, we can now turn to the legal sphere. Part I shows that
wrongful life claims have ultimately failed in most Western jurisdic-
tions. Part II explains that the universal reluctance to allow these
claims is an inevitable result of the attempt to establish the child's
right against the consultant within the traditional conceptual frame-
work of tort law. Part III argues that framing the child's claim as an
action in tort has been an unfortunate mistake and that we could
avoid the fierce disputes triggered by wrongful life claims through an
innovative use of an alternative conceptual framework. The dogmatic
tort-based discourse has been regnant for about four decades, 40 but
we must not bestow it eternal life.
I
A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW
Wrongful life cases seem to fall within the ordinary medical mal-
practice paradigm: a doctor fails to comply with a professional stan-
dard of care, resulting in pain, suffering, and unplanned costs.4 1 It is
not surprising, therefore, that claims for wrongful life have been
framed as actions in tort, regardless of the jurisdiction. 42 Yet the tradi-
tional tort framework seems quite unpromising to the typical plaintiff.
Nearly all Western jurisdictions have categorically denied wrongful life
claims. 43 Even in the very few jurisdictions where a daring court al-
lowed recovery, a negating statutory or judicial reaction usually
followed.4 4
The following comparative overview thus serves an extremely im-
portant goal. It enables us to grasp the intensity of hostility toward
tort actions for wrongful life. The nearly universal consensus is com-
pelling evidence of some kind of inherent dissonance between wrong-
ful life claims and the conceptual framework of tort law. At this stage,
I do not endeavor to explicate the nature and origins of such disso-
nance; I use comparative law simply to substantiate its existence.
40 It apparently began in Gleitman ex rel. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J.
1967), abrogated 6y Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979). See Belsky, supra note 20, at
191-92, 191 n.15 (describing the first application of "wrongful life claims" in the medical
malpractice context in a 1967 New Jersey case).
41 See Belsky, supra note 20, at 189-90.
42 See id. (demonstrating that the cause of action in these cases fits within the rubric of
tort). Certain jurisdictions also based the action on contract theory, but this did not
change its true nature because the contractual obligation on which the claim hinged was
practically identical to the duty of care in tort-namely the obligation to comply with a
professional standard of care. See, e.g., infra note 135.
4 3 See infra Part L.A (describing the majority of American jurisdictions as denying the
viability of wrongful life claims and noting that only a few allow the cause of action).
44 See infta notes 77-78 and accompanying text (describing the swift reversal by the
New York Court of Appeals of an appellate decision allowing a wrongful life claim).
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A. Common-Law Jurisdictions
The conventional view in the United States is that a child born
with congenital disabilities cannot claim damages from the person
whose negligence resulted in the child's birth. The leading case is
Gleitman v. Cosgrove,45 decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
1967. In that case, a pregnant woman informed her obstetrician that
she had suffered from rubella during the first month of her preg-
nancy.46 The doctor assured her that this would not affect her fetus
although he knew that twenty percent of fetuses exposed to the virus
during the first trimester would be born disabled. 47 The woman con-
sequently gave birth to a child who suffered from vision, hearing, and
speech disabilities. 48 The court denied the child's claim for wrongful
life. 49
Following Gleitman, wrongful life claims have been denied by the
courts in more than twenty states: Alabama, 50 Arizona, 5 1 Colorado, 52
Delaware, 53 Florida, 54 Georgia, 55 Illinois, 56 Kansas,5 7 Kentucky, 58 Loui-
siana,59 Maryland, 60 Massachusetts, 6 1 Nevada, 6 2 New Hampshire, 63
45 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967).
46 Id. at 690.
47 Id. at 691.
48 Id. at 690.
49 Id. at 692.
50 E.g., Elliott ex rel. Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978).
51 E.g., Walker ex rel. Pizano v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 740-41 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc).
52 E.g., Lininger ex rel. Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1210-11 (Colo. 1988)
(en banc).
53 E.g., Garrison ex rel. Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of Del. Inc., 581 A.2d 288, 293-94 (Del.
1990).
54 E.g., Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 423 (Fla. 1992).
55 E.g., Spires v. Kim, 416 S.E.2d 780, 781-82 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
56 E.g., Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 702 (111. 1987); Goldberg
v. Ruskin, 499 N.E.2d 406, 410 (Ill. 1986).
57 E.g., Bruggeman ex ret. Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d 635, 642 (Kan. 1986).
58 E.g., Grubbs ex rel. Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Ctr., P.S.C., 120 S.W.3d
682, 689-90 (Ky. 2003).
59 E.g., Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 517 So. 2d 1019, 1024-25 (La. Ct. App. 1987),
affd in part, revd in part, 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988).
60 E.g., Kassama v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1123 (Md. 2002).
61 E.g., Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 12-13 (Mass. 1990).
62 E.g., Greco ex rel. Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 347-48 (Nev. 1995).
63 E.g., Smith ex rel. Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 353-55 (N.H. 1986).
[Vol. 93:329
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New York, 64 North Carolina, 65 Ohio,66 South Carolina 6 7 Texas,68 Vir-
ginia, 69 West Virginia, 70 Wisconsin, 71 and Wyoming.72 The legisla-
tures of several states have explicitly barred wrongful life claims.73
Some statutes provide that there shall be no cause of action based on
the claim that but for the conduct of another, the claimant "would not
have been conceived or, once conceived, would not have been permit-
ted to have been born alive."7 4 In other states, the statute only bars
actions based on the claim that but for the conduct of another, the
mother would have aborted the fetus. 75 However, these states' courts
tend to deny recovery in cases of preconception negligence as well. 76
Only a few states allow recovery. In 1977, the Appellate Division
of the New York Supreme Court was the first to recognize a wrongful
life cause of action in tort.77 However, the New York Court of Appeals
reversed the ground-breaking decisions a few months later.78 In 1982,
the Supreme Court of California allowed recovery in tort for wrongful
64 With regard to New York, see infta notes 77-78 and accompanying text. Note that
a few courts held that the parents were entitled to compensation for the extraordinary cost
of nurturing the child for as long as the child was incapable of independent life. See, e.g.,
Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 423-24 (Fla. 1992);James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872,
882-83 (W. Va. 1985).
65 E.g., Azzolino ex rel. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 532-33 (N.C. 1985).
66 E.g., Hester ex rel. Hester v. Dwivedi, 733 N.E.2d 1161, 1166-68 (Ohio 2000).
67 E.g., Willis ex rel. Willis v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63, 71 (S.C. 2004).
68 E.g., Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924-25 (Tex. 1984).
69 E.g., Glascock v. Laserna, 30 Va. Cir. 366, 369 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1993); Barnes v. Head,
30 Va. Cir. 218, 221-22 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1993).
70 E.g.,James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 879-81 (W. Va. 1985).
71 E.g., Dumer ex rel. Bloch v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 375-76 (Wis.
1975).
72 E.g., Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 289 (Wyo. 1982).
73 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-334(1) (2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-12-1-1 (Lexis-
Nexis 1998); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2971(2) (West Supp. 2007), following Eisbren-
ner v. Stanley, 308 N.W.2d 209, 212-13 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), abrogated by Taylor v.
Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424(1) (West 2005); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 188.130(1) (West 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-43 (1996); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8305(b) (West 2007), following Ellis v. Sherman, 515 A.2d 1327, 1329-30 (Pa.
1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-1 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (2002).
74 S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 21-55-1; see also MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2971(2); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(b).
75 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 5-334(1); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-12-1-1; MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 145.424(1); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.130(1); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-43; UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-11-24.
76 See Cowe ex rel. Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630, 632-35 (Ind. 1991).
77 Becker v. Schwartz, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119, 119-20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977), modified, 386
N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978); Park v. Chessin, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 114 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977),
modified sub nom. Becker, 386 N.E.2d 807.
78 See Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 812; see also Sheppard-Mobley ex rel. Mobley v. King, 830
N.E.2d 301, 305 (N.Y. 2005) (explaining that an infant plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of
action for wrongful life); Alquijay ex rel. Alquijay v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 473
N.E.2d 244, 245-46 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that New York does not recognize a cause of
action for wrongful life).
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life, 79 and the Supreme Court of Washington followed suit the next
year.8 0 In 1984, the Supreme Court of New Jersey joined the minority
and reversed Gleitman.8 1 Despite recognizing wrongful life actions,
these three courts allowed recovery only for the special costs incurred
because of the plaintiff's condition, not for pain and suffering. 82 In
Maine, the legislature has recognized a cause of action for wrongful
life.83 Finally, neither the Connecticut legislature nor the Supreme
Court of Connecticut has addressed the issue, but lower courts of that
state have released conflicting decisions. 84
In England, the Court of Appeal initially resolved the question in
McKay v. Essex Area Health Authority.85 In McKay, a pregnant woman
infected with rubella was unaware of the risk because the defendant's
laboratory failed to diagnose her illness through blood tests.8 6 She
gave birth to a disabled girl in August 1975.87 The Court of Appeal
allowed the mother's claim for wrongful birth but unanimously re-
jected the child's action for wrongful life.8 8
In 1976, following the recommendations of a Law Commission, 89
Parliament enacted the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act. 90
The Act stipulates that a child born with disabilities attributable to
79 See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 966 (Cal. 1982) (en banc). For a critical analy-
sis of Turpin, see generally Kurtis J. Kearl, Turpin v. Sortini: Recognizing the Unsupportable
Cause of Action for Wrongful Life, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1278 (1983). The Court of Appeal of
California had recognized a cause of action two years earlier in Curlender ex rel. Curlender
v. Bio-Sci. Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 489 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). The court in Curlender,
unlike the court in Turpin, allowed recovery for pain and suffering. See id. at 489-90.
80 See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 497 (Wash. 1983) (en banc). For a
critical analysis of Harbeson, see generally Mark R. Attwood, Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.:
A Major Step Forward in the Evolution of Wrongful Life, 10 J. CONTEMP. L. 203 (1984).
81 See Procanik ex rel. Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 765 (N.J. 1984), rev'd, 543 A.2d
985 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988). In 1992, a New Jersey court held that a person born
prior to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), could not bring a wrongful life action if the
negligent conduct occurred during pregnancy. See Hummel ex rel. Hummel v. Reiss, 608
A.2d 1341, 1345-47 (NJ. 1992). Clearly, this qualification no longer has any practical
significance.
82 See Turpin, 643 P.2d at 964-66; Procanik, 478 A.2d at 761-63; Harbeson, 656 P.2d at
496-97.
83 24 ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 2931(3) (2000), as applied in Anastosopoulos v.
Perakis, No. CV-91-313, 1995 Me. Super. LEXIS 504, at *11-16 (Jan. 27, 1995).
84 See Quinn v. Blau, No. CV 96325691S, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3319, at *22 (Dec.
10, 1997) (allowing a wrongful life claim); Donnelly v. Candlewood Obstetric-Gynecologi-
cal Assocs., P.C., No. 30 20 96, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1682, at *3 (June 8, 1992) (re-
jecting a wrongful life claim).
85 [1982] 1 Q.B. 1166 (Eng. C.A.).
86 Id. at 1172-74.
87 Id. at 1171-72.
88 Id. at 1171.
89 LAw COMMISON, REPORT ON INJURIES TO UNBORN CHILDREN, No. 60 (1974) [here-
inafter INJURIES TO UNBORN CHILDREN].
90 Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act, 1976, c. 28 (Eng.).
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another person's fault may claim damages from that person.9 1 Tech-
nically, the Act applies only to births after its enactment-July 22,
197692-so it did not apply to McKay. Yet the McKay court interpreted
the Act in obiter dictum as excluding liability for wrongful life where the
defendant's conduct did not cause the disability.9 3 The court based its
interpretation on the purpose of the Act9 4 as manifested in the Law
Commission's report.9 5
The Act applies to births taking place after its enactment, and for
any such birth, it replaces any law in force before its enactment
"whereby a person could be liable to a child in respect of disabilities
with which it might be born. ' 96 So a person born by that date cannot
bring a wrongful life claim under McKay, and a person born after that
date cannot bring such a suit according to the Act. Given the signifi-
cant time elapsed since the legislative intervention, the importance of
McKay in England lies in its interpretation of the Act in obiter dictum
and not in its elaborate analysis of the preenactment common law.
However, the latter has been influential in other British Common-
wealth jurisdictions.
For example, although the Supreme Court of Canada has not ad-
dressed the issue,9 7 several courts in British Columbia, Manitoba, and
Ontario have dismissed wrongful life claims under the strong influ-
ence of McKay.98 In Australia, the Common Law Division of the Su-
preme Court of New South Wales was the first to reject wrongful life
claims,9 9 followed by the Supreme Court of Queensland.10 0 Both de-
cisions relied heavily on McKay. Subsequently, the New South Wales
91 Id. § 1; see id. § 1(2) ("An occurrence to which this section applies is one ...
[where] the child is born with disabilities which would not otherwise have been present.").
92 Id. § 4(5).
93 See McKay, [1982] Q.B. at 1177-78, 1182.
94 See id. at 1182.
95 INJURIES TO UNBORN CHILDREN, supra note 89, at 34 ("We do not think that, in the
strict sense of the term, an action for 'wrongful life' should lie.").
96 Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act § 4(5).
97 Dean Stretton, The Birth Torts: Damages for Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life, 10
DEAKIN L. REv. 319, 349-50 (2005).
98 See, e.g., Jones ex rel. Short v. Rostvig, [1999] 86 A.C.W.S.3d 980 (B.C. Sup. Ct.);
Arndt v. Smith, [1994] 93 B.C.L.R.2d 220, 227 (B.C. Sup. Ct.); Lacroix v. Dominique,
[2001] 202 D.L.R.4th 121, 131-33 (Man. C.A.); Mickle v. Salvation Army Grace Hosp.,
[1999] 166 D.L.R.4th 743, 761-64 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.).
99 See Edwards v. Blomeley (2002) N.S.W.S.C. 460 (Austl.), available at http://www.
austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/supremect/2 0 0 2/ 4 6 0.html; Harriton ex rel. Harriton v. Ste-
phens (2002) N.S.W.S.C. 461 (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/
nsw/supreme_ct/2002/461.html; Waller ex rel. Waller v. James (2002) N.S.W.S.C. 462
(Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/supremect/2002/462.html.
100 See Hayne v. Nyst (1995) Q.S.C. 260 (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/
au/cases/qld/QSC/1995/260.html.
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Court of Appeal endorsed the views of the Common Law Division,' °'
and the High Court of Australia upheld the rulings of the Court of
Appeal. 0 2 The High Court of Singapore also found English prece-
dent persuasive in holding that "[a]t common law, a disabled child
has no cause of action for [wrongful life] ." 103
The Scottish Court of Session has not yet decided a wrongful life
case. 10 4 However, it dismissed a claim against a statutory board em-
powered to make ex gratia payments for personal injuries resulting
from crimes of violence by a child born out of incest with disabilities
attributable to the consanguinity of her parents.10 5 The court analo-
gized to a wrongful life case because the child concerned could not
exist in a nondefective state.10 6 Based primarily on McKay, it held that
the common law, "with logical justification, has set its face against the
possibility of making an assessment of damages in a [wrongful life
case]."°107 A year later, the same court allowed a wrongful birth action,
stating that it expected the same result as in McKay if a wrongful life
case were to come before a Scottish court.'08
Israel seems to be the only common-law jurisdiction'0 9 that allows
tort recovery for both special and general damages in a wrongful life
action. In its landmark decision in Zeitsov v. Katz,110 the Supreme
Court held four-to-one that a severely disabled child may claim dam-
ages from the person whose negligence resulted in that child's
birth.1 1' However, the majority disagreed as to the availability of the
101 See Harriton ex rel. Harriton v. Stephens (2004) N.S.W.C.A. 93 (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWCA/2004/93.html.
102 See Harriton ex rel. Harriton v. Stephens (2006) 266 C.L.R. 52 (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2006/15.html; Waller ex rel. Waller v.
James, (2006) C.L.R. 136 (Aust.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/
HCA/2006/16.html.
103 Ju v. See Tho Kai Yin, [2005] 4 Sing. L. Rep. 96, 120 (High Ct. Sing.), available at
http://www.singaporelaw.sg/rss/judg/49044.html.
104 Although the Scottish legal system is a mixed jurisdiction, its "law of delict" is quite
indistinguishable from the common law of torts. See Stephen R. Perry, Tort Law, in A COM-
PANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 57, 58 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
105 P's Curator Bonis v. Crim. Injuries Comp. Bd., 1997 S.L.T. 1180, 1200 (Outer
House 1996).
106 See id. at 1197-98.
107 Id.
108 Anderson v. Forth Valley Health Bd., 1998 S.L.T. 588, 604 (Outer House 1997).
Still, the parents in a wrongful birth claim recovered past and future special costs incurred
by the child's disability, including those incurred after attaining the age of majority. Id. at
606.
109 Although the Israeli legal system may be regarded as a mixed jurisdiction (with
numerous continental features), Israeli tort law is based almost wholly on common-law
principles. See Israel Gilead, Non-Consensual Liability of a Contracting Party: Contract, Negli-
gence, Both, or In-Between ?, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 511, 531 (2002).
110 CA 512/81 [1986] IsrSC 40(2) 85.
111 Id. at 86.
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new cause of action in cases of less severe disability and as to the calcu-
lation of damages.' 12 These controversies remain unresolved."13
B. Continental Jurisdictions
The steadfast reluctance to impose liability for wrongful life is
also characteristic of most continental jurisdictions, 114 Germanic and
Romanic alike. In 1983, the Supreme Court of Germany (Bundesger-
ichtshof) decided the issue in a case similar to Gleitman and McKay.'1 5
A pregnant woman infected with rubella gave birth to a disabled
child.1 6 She was unaware of the risk to her fetus because her doctor
failed to diagnose the infection during the pregnancy." 17 Had she
known, she would have undergone an abortion."' The court held
that the child could not claim damages for wrongful life 1 9 and re-
mained faithful to this view in subsequent cases.' 20 Similarly, the Su-
preme Court of Austria (Oberstergerichtshof) rejected a wrongful life
action stemming from a negligently performed prenatal ultrasound
scan. 121
Section 1382 of the French Code Civil states: "Any conduct of a
man which causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it
occurred to make reparation."'122 In a few cases decided in 1996, the
Supreme Court for civil and criminal matters (Cour de cassation) quite
surprisingly allowed recovery for wrongful life under this Section. 123
In one case, prospective parents wanted to find out whether their off-
112 See id. at 104, 126 (Ben-Porat, J., and D. Levin, J., holding that the plaintiff should
be compensated only for severe damage); id. at 121, 123 (Barak, J., and S. Levin,J., holding
that all damage, even if small, should be compensated).
113 A. Ticho & G.A. Kreisberg, New Trends in Obstetrical Ultrasound Malpractice Litigation
in Israel 23 MED. & L. 725, 726 (2004) (noting the ongoing debate regarding the legal
validity of wrongful life claims under Israeli law).
114 See, e.g., John Anthony Eaton, Wrongful Life Claims: A Comparative Analysis, 35 HONG
KONG L.J. 671, 680-81 (2005) (discussing the refusal of the European Commission on
Human Rights to recognize a claim for wrongful life).
115 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 18, 1983, 86 Ent-
scheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 240 (F.R.G.), translation
available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/ transnational/work.new/ger-
man/case.php?id=679.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 4, 1997, 50
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1638 (F.R.G.).
121 Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] May 25, 1999, 1 Ob 91/99k, 72
Entscheidungen des 6sterreichischen Obersten Gerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [SZ] No. 91
(Austria), translation available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transna-
tional/work-new/austrian/case.php?id=1392.
122 C. civ. § 1382 (John H. Crabb trans.).
123 For further discussion, see WALTER VAN GERVEN ET AL., CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT
ON NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TORT LAw 116-18 (2000).
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spring might suffer from a certain hereditary neurological disorder. 124
A genetic counselor assured them that no such risk existed, and the
woman decided to conceive based on this representation.125 She gave
birth to a child with the neurological disorder, and the child brought
suit against the counselor. 126 His claim succeeded. 127 In another
French case, now commonly known as the Perruche case, medical per-
sonnel incorrectly informed a pregnant woman that she did not have
rubella. 128 The error resulted from the combined negligence of her
physician and the laboratory that examined her blood. 129 The woman
gave birth to a severely disabled boy. 130 Once again, the court allowed
the child's action. 13
The Supreme Administrative Court (Conseil d'Etat) expressed a
different opinion a year later in Quarez. 132 The defendants negligently
performed an amniocentesis and failed to discover that the patient's
fetus suffered from Down syndrome.133 The court dismissed the
child's claim for wrongful life mainly for lack of causation between the
defendants' negligence and the child's disabilities.1 34 Nonetheless,
the Cour de cassation adhered to its initial stance. In 2000, it reaf-
firmed its earlier decision in the Perruche case after a lower court had
dared to defy it.13 5 The Cour de cassation reiterated the same views in
five more cases the following year. 136
However, this French revolution was short lived. The court's rul-
ings sparked intense criticism from two different directions. 137 First,
124 Cour de cassation, Premiere chambre civile [Cass. le civ.] [highest court of ordi-
nary jurisdiction, first civil chamber] Mar. 26, 1996, Bull. civ. I, No. 155, p. 109.
125 See id.
126 See id.
127 See id.
128 Cour de cassation, Premiere chambre civile [Cass. le civ.] [highest court of ordi-
nary jurisdiction, first civil chamber] Mar. 26, 1996, Bull. civ. I, No. 156, p. 109.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 CE Sect., Feb. 14, 1997, Rec. Lebon 44. The case was brought before the Conseil
d'Etat because the defendant (Centre hospitalier de Nice) was a state hospital.
133 Id.
134 Id. The Conseil d'ttat held, however, that the parents could recover for the special
costs resulting from the child's disability throughout his or her life. Id.
t35 See Cour de cassation, Assemble plnire [Cass. ass. pl~n.] [highest court of origi-
nal jurisdiction, plenary assembly] Nov. 17, 2000, Bull.Ass.Pl~n., No. 9, p. 15. The court
found that the defendants' negligence constituted breach of contract and based liability on
contract theory.
136 See Cour de cassation, Assemble pl~ni4re [Cass. ass. pl~n.] [highest court of origi-
nal jurisdiction, plenary assembly] Nov. 28, 2001, Bull.Ass.Plan., Nos. 15-16, pp. 30-33
(two cases); Cour de cassation, AssembIe plenire [Cass. ass. pIn.] [highest court of orig-
inal jurisdiction, plenary assembly] July 13, 2001, Bull.Ass.Phn., No. 10, p. 21-22 (three
cases).
137 See France Re'ects 'Right Not to Be Born, 'BBC NEws, Jan. 10, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/europe/1752556.stm.
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disabled people claimed that the court treated their lives as inferior to
nonexistence. 138 Second, gynecologists, obstetricians, and ultraso-
nographers argued that those rulings induced them to recommend an
abortion even where the fetus had a low probability of congenital disa-
bility.139 They also maintained that insurance premiums had signifi-
cantly increased, jeopardizing the incentive to provide prenatal
medical services and, consequently, the availability of such services. "41
The political pressures resulted in legislative reaction. 14' On Jan-
uary 10, 2002, the Assemble Nationale adopted, in the first reading, a
bill whereby no person might claim that he or she was damaged by
being born. 142 The Act was ultimately passed on March 4, 2002,' 4-
placing France in line with the vast majority of Western
jurisdictions. 14 4
In 2001, the Portuguese Supreme Court ofJustice (Supremo Tribu-
nal deJustifa) held that wrongful life claims cannot be allowed. 145 In
2004, the Italian Supreme Court (Corte Suprema di Cassazione) reached
a similar conclusion. 146 In Belgium, although an appellate court has
yet to discuss the question of tort liability for wrongful life, the Cham-
ber of Representatives introduced a legislative proposal in January
2002 similar to that adopted in France. 147 This proposal has not yet
been accepted.' 48 Interestingly, in June 2002 the Brussels Court of
138 See id.
139 See id.
140 See id.
141 See id.
142 Assemble nationale, Illme lgislature, texte adopti n2 757 (Jan. 10, 2002), pro-
position de loi relative A la solidarit6 nationale et A l'indemnisation des handicaps con-
g~nitaux, available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/ta/ta0757.asp (last visited Nov.
19, 2007).
143 Law No. 2002-303 of Mar. 4, 2002, Journal Officiel de la R~publique Fran4aise
U.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 5, 2002, p. 4118. Section 1(1) provided that one
cannot obtain damages only because of one's birth. The act was ultimately integrated into
the Code de L'action Sociale et des Families § LI 14-5.
144 Section 1 (1) also provided that it would be applicable to pending proceedings ex-
cept for those in which "an irrevocable decision has been taken on the principle of com-
pensation." However, the European Court of Human Rights held that insofar as it
concerned proceedings pending on March 7, 2002, the date of its entry into force, § 1 (1)
violates Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, which protects a person's right to peaceful enjoyment of his
or her possessions. See Draon v. France [GC], no. 1513/03, [2005] ECHR 679 (Oct. 6,
2005); Maurice v. France [GC], no. 11810/03, [2005] ECHR 679 (Oct. 6, 2005).
145 Revista no. 1008/01-1 (June 19, 2001), reported by Andr6 G. Dias Pereira in EURO-
PEAN TORT LAw 2002, 350 (Helmut Koziol & Barbara C. Steinninger eds., 2003).
146 Cass., sez. tre, 29 July 2004, n.14488, Foro It. I, 12, 3327. I am grateful to Giovanni
Comand6 for sending me the official transcript of this case.
147 Chambre des representants de Belgique, 50ime legislature, document parle-
mentaire 1596 (Jan. 17, 2002), proposition de loi insorant un article 1383bis dans le Code
civil pr~cisant qu'il n'y a pas de prejudice du seul fait de sa naissance, available at http://
www.lachambre.be/FLW"B/PDF/50/1596/50K1596001.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
148 See id.
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First Instance relied on the Perruche case in holding a doctor who
failed to diagnose the malformation of a fetus, thereby depriving the
parents of the opportunity to terminate the pregnancy, liable to the
disabled child. 149
There is only one exception to the general rejection of wrongful
life actions in Western Europe. In 2003, the Court of Appeal of The
Hague (GerechtshofDen Haag) awarded damages to a child born with a
severe chromosomal abnormality on the assumption that, but for the
defendant's failure to inform the mother of the risk, the child would
have been aborted.1 50 The Court held, counter to biological reality,
that the plaintiffs disorder resulted from the defendant's negli-
gence.1 5 1 On appeal, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge
Raad) affirmed, allowing the plaintiff to recover for her costs of living
and for her pain and suffering.152 So far, the legislature has not con-
sidered any reaction. 153 Still, this sole exception highlights the com-
mon view.
II
IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM
A. The Conceptual Framework
Having explored the universal hostility to wrongful life claims, I
will now critically appraise its reasons. My fundamental argument is
that framing a child's suit against the consultant in wrongful life set-
tings as an action in tort is a conceptual error. This claim stems from
a profound understanding of the conceptual boundaries of tort law at
the highest level of abstraction. Hence, it is immaterial whether
wrongful life claims are based on negligence or on alternative torts.
Having said that, it is possible to explain why tort law cannot recog-
nize a wrongful life claim using the conceptual framework of the tort
of negligence. Negligence is an abstract legal framework applicable to
myriad situations, including new ones that legislatures or courts never
contemplated. 15 4 Actions for damages in situations that fall outside
the bounds of a specific tort may find their way to the basket tort of
149 Tribunal de premiere instance de Bruxelles [T.P.I.B.] [Court of first instance]
Brussels, 7juin 2002, [2002] R.G.D.C./T.B.B.R. 483, 483-84 (Bel.).
150 See H.F.L. Nys &J.C.J. Dute, A Wrongful Existence in the Netherlands, 30J. MED. ETHICS
393, 393-94 (2004).
151 See id.
152 Leids Universitair Medisch Centrum/Molenaar, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden
[HR] [Supreme Court of the Netherlands], 18 maart 2005, NJ 209 (ann. LS) (Neth.).
153 See Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief, The Netherlands, in EUROPEAN TORT LAw 2005, at
414, 422 (Helmut Koziol & Barbara C. Steininger eds., 2006).
154 See Harriton ex rel. Harriton v. Stephens, (2006) 226 C.L.R. 52, para. 151 (Austi.)
(Kirby, J., dissenting), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2006/15.
html ("Part of the genius of the tort of negligence in the common law has been its mallea-
bility and versatility, which permit it to respond to the exigencies of changing times.").
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negligence.1 55 Thus, the limits of negligence represent, to a great ex-
tent, the boundaries of tort law. If a court disallows a wrongful life
claim as an action for negligence, it is unlikely to allow the claim
under a different tort. Using negligence as the conceptual framework
for the analysis also coheres with common practice; in all common-law
jurisdictions, wrongful life claims are litigated as actions for
negligence.
The tort of negligence comprises four elements: duty of care,
breach of the duty (substandard conduct), harm, and a causal relation
between the breach and the harm.1 56 My discussion is limited to three
of the four. I shall assume that the duty of care has been breached-
that the consultant failed to use the skill that a reasonable, intelligent,
and competent person would have used or failed to adopt the degree
of caution that such a person would have adopted under the circum-
stances. I do this for two reasons. First, the question of substandard
conduct turns on the particular circumstances of each case. My cen-
tral goal is to present the inbuilt flaws of the tort-based wrongful life
action at its most abstract level. Therefore, the particulars of a specific
consultant's conduct in a concrete case are only marginally important.
Second, establishing breach of duty requires a discussion of the appro-
priate method of performing medical procedures, which should prop-
erly and naturally be left to those with the requisite expertise. In
terms of logical order, the first issue to address is the existence of a
duty of care. In the absence of duty there can be no breach, and
without breach there can be no negligence. 157 Assuming that the duty
has been breached, I will address the question of harm immediately
thereafter. Finally, I will address the causal connection between the
breach and the harm.
B. Duty of Care
1. The Formal Question: Legal Personality
Under traditional common law, an individual acquires legal per-
sonality upon live birth. 158 Accordingly, a fetus does not have legal
rights until the moment of birth, and nobody owes legal duties to it.
Some may argue that the substandard conduct in a wrongful life con-
text occurs at the prenatal stage when nobody owes a duty of care to
155 See id.
156 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM §§ 3, 6-7
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 71 (2007); W. PAGE KEE-
TON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
157 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 156, at 164.
158 See, e.g., FRANCIS TRINDADE & PETER CANE, THE LAW OF TORTS IN AUSTRALIA 405 (2d
ed. 1993); Timothy StoltzfusJost, Rights of Embryo and Foetus in Private Law, 50 Am. J. Comp.
L. 633, 633-34 (2002); ErnestJ. Weinrib, The Passing of Palsgraf?, 54 VAND. L. REv. 803, 807
(2001).
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the fetus. Substandard conduct cannot constitute breach of duty in
the absence of duty. Consequently, there is no adequate basis for
liability.
For a number of decades, American courts refused to allow recov-
ery by persons injured in utero, claiming that a fetus was an insepara-
ble part of its mother's body and that it lacked independent legal
personality. 159 In 1946, a court first held that a duty of care may exist
with respect to a person who was still en ventre sa mare at the time of the
substandard conduct, provided that the person was viable at that time
and was ultimately born alive. 160 The underlying rationale for this
change was that a fetus is entitled to protection from the moment it
becomes an independent biological entity. Later rulings established
that even a fetus that was not viable at the time of the substandard
conduct was entitled to sue the tortfeasor following birth.' 6' Today, a
duty of care may exist even if the plaintiff had not been conceived at
the time of the substandard conduct-provided that the plaintiff was
subsequently born alive. 162 The central rationale is that a duty of care
is based on the foreseeability of future harm to a certain type of per-
sons, not necessarily to an existing and identifiable person. 163
This development found similar expression in other legal sys-
tems. An Australian court held in 1972 that if a fetus sustained an
injury during pregnancy due to carelessness, it would have a right to
sue the tortfeasor after its birth.164 The court noted that the question
of fetal legal personality required no discussion because the cause of
action rested on the postnatal harm that the plaintiff had sustained
159 The leading case is Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884).
See also Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 56 N.E. 638, 639-40 (Ill. 1900), overnuled by Amann v.
Faidy, 114 N.E.2d 412 (Il1. 1953); Buel v. United Rys. Co., 154 S.W. 71, 72 (Mo. 1913),
overruled by Steggall v. Morris, 258 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1953); TimothyJ. Dawe, Wrongful Life:
Timefora "Day in Court, "51 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 477 (1990); Anastasia Enneking, TheMissouri
Supreme Court Recognizes Preconception Tort Liability: Lough v. Rolla Women's Clinic, Inc., 63
UMKC L. REv. 165, 169-70 (1994).
160 SeeBonbrestv. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 139-42 (D.D.C. 1946); see also Keyes v. Constr.
Serv., Inc., 165 N.E.2d 912, 915 (Mass. 1960); Steggall v. Morris, 258 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Mo.
1953); Enneking, supra note 159, at 166 n.9, 171-72.
161 See, e.g., Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 93 S.E.2d 727, 728 (Ga. 1956);
Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926, 927 (Mass. 1967); LaBlue v. Specker, 100
N.W.2d 445, 455 (Mich. 1960); Bennett v. Hymers, 147 A.2d 108, 110 (N.H. 1958).
162 See, e.g.,Jorgensen ex rel.Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Labs., Inc., 483 F.2d 237, 240
(10th Cir. 1973); Renslowv. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ill. 1977); Walker ex
rel. Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591, 595-96 (Ind. 1992); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp.,
530 So. 2d 1151, 1157-58 (La. 1988); McNulty exrel. McNultyv. McDowell, 613 N.E.2d 904,
906 (Mass. 1993); Lough ex rel. Lough v. Rolla Women's Clinic, Inc., 866 S.W.2d 851,
853-54 (Mo. 1993).
163 See Mark L. Monopoli, McNulty v. McDowell: Recognizing Preconception Tort in the
Commonwealth?, 29 NEw ENG. L. REV. 763, 779 (1995).
164 SeeWattv. Rama, (1972) V.R. 353, 361.
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since his birth. 165 Later, Australian courts extended this principle to
cases in which the substandard conduct occurred prior to concep-
tion. 166 A similar view pertains in Canada with respect to prenatal
injuries. 167
In England, the turning point came in 1976 with the enactment
of the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act. 16 8 The Act provides
that a child born with disabilities attributable to a prenatal occurrence
that affected the ability of one of the parents to produce a normal
child, affected the mother during pregnancy, or affected the mother
or child during birth may claim damages from the person at fault. 169
As noted above, the Act applies only to births taking place after its
effective date. 1 70 Regarding births prior to that date, the Court of Ap-
peal held in 1992 that an action in tort may exist for prebirth inju-
ries.17 ' The court explained that the plaintiffs injury was a
foreseeable consequence of the defendant's substandard conduct and
that the cause of action only crystallized upon the plaintiffs birth and
simultaneous acquisition of legal personality.' 72
In my view, the fundamental solution to the legal personality
question lies in the distinction between the duty of care and the duty
to compensate a person injured by a breach of the duty of care. The
first is an abstract duty that does not correlate with a specific right and
does not relate to a specific potential victim. The second is a concrete
duty that correlates with a specific right. It only crystallizes if the first
duty is breached and a specific person sustains an injury. An injury
may occur long after the substandard conduct and at a location re-
mote from the place of that conduct, but there is no specific right
against the wrongdoer until the occurrence of injury.
For example, if A manufactured a defective product, B purchased
the product, and after a certain period B sustained an injury because
of the defect, B's right against A crystallized when the damage oc-
curred. The duty of care that A owed to potential purchasers did not
confer on B a concrete right against A until that time. If a person
owes a duty of care to a class of potential victims and breaches that
duty, and if none of the members of the class sustains an injury as a
result, none of them will have any right against that person. As men-
tioned, the duty of care is abstract and does not per se confer concrete
rights of action. Because the concrete right crystallizes when damage
165 See id. at 359-60.
166 See X & Y v. Pal, (1991) 23 N.S.W.L.R. 26, 37.
167 See Duval v. Seguin, [1972] 26 D.L.R.3d 418, 434 (Can.).
168 Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act, 1976, c. 28 (Eng.).
169 Id. § 1(2).
170 Id. § 4(5).
171 Burton v. Islington Health Auth., [1993] Q.B. 204, 218-20 (Eng. C.A.).
172 Id.
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occurs, the plaintiff must have legal personality at this point, not
beforehand.
This also applies to preconception and prenatal carelessness. As-
sume, for example, that a person carelessly builds a veranda and that a
mother and her year-old child are injured two years later when the
construction collapses. It would be nonsensical to claim that only the
mother could recover damages simply because the child had not yet
been born when the negligence occurred.17 3 The builder owed a duty
of care to all who might be on the veranda after its construction. On
the other hand, law can only impose a duty to compensate with re-
spect to persons actually injured by the collapse. 174 The fact that the
minor did not exist-legally and physically-at the time of the care-
lessness is immaterial because the child does not claim that he or she
had a concrete right against the defendant at that time. The same
principle enables us to impose liability on a manufacturer of baby
food even if the victim-baby's birth came long after the product left
the factory. 175 That the plaintiff did not exist at the time of the care-
lessness will not frustrate the action. As above, the manufacturer owes
a duty of care to all who may use the product, whereas the manufac-
turer only owes a duty to compensate with regard to persons who actu-
ally sustain injuries by using it.176
In cases where the defendant's misconduct caused the plaintiff
prenatal injuries, prima facie, an additional difficulty arises. Such a
plaintiff brings an action for injury incurred prior to birth-when the
plaintiff had no legal personality. It may appear that if the concrete
right arises with the occurrence of injury and at that time the victim
had no legal personality, then no right can accrue. The conventional
answer, however, is that the injury occurs only at the moment of birth,
when the child begins to suffer from the effects of the impairment. 177
In a tort action for wrongful life, there is no need for a similar fiction.
The plaintiff does not and cannot claim that the congenital disability
is the injury complained of because the defendant did not cause the
disability. The plaintiffs claim is that entry into a life of misery is the
injury (hence the title of her action). That "injury" and the plaintiff's
legal personality crystallize in tandem.
173 See Lough ex rel. Lough v. Rolla Women's Clinic, Inc., 866 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo.
1993).
174 See id. (discussing the policy considerations inherent in tort liability).
175 See id.
176 See id.
177 See, e.g., Harriton ex rel. Harriton v. Stephens (2006) 226 C.L.R. 52, para. 66 (Austl.)
(Kirby, J., dissenting), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2006/15.
html; TRINDADE & CANE, supra note 158, at 405-06.
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2. The Substantive Question: Legal Policy
a. Claims Against Parents
One of the major policy concerns that opponents of liability for
wrongful life raise pertains to the possible-perhaps inevitable-ex-
pansion of the circle of defendants. This argument is two tiered.
First, opponents maintain that it is unjust to impose liability for
wrongful life on a stranger if one does not impose liability on the par-
ents, assuming that they made a conscious choice to conceive and pro-
ceed with a pregnancy with full knowledge that a seriously impaired
infant would be born.178 According to Professor Tedeschi, "It would
be difficult to justify the resulting discrimination which would hold a
stranger liable, but not a parent.'"' 79
On the second level, opponents contend that this extension of
liability would have grave implications. One unwarranted conse-
quence of allowing children to sue their parents is the ostensible in-
terference with the integrity of the family unit. 180 The law might
become an arena to exacerbate internal family conflicts, wreaking
grief and animosity and severing the fabric of regular family life. One
of the aims of the legal system is to protect the family unit, and confer-
ring power on a child to wage a legal battle against the parents is in-
consistent with that objective. 18' A similar consideration helped
justify spousal immunity against tort claims, which was once a part of
the common law. 182
An additional result of recognizing the child's action against the
parents is the damage caused to the child's emotional well-being by
waging war against the parents in court.183 Concern for injury to mi-
nors' feelings is not limited to children's suits against their parents.
The parents' claim against a doctor whose negligence led to the birth
of a healthy but unwanted child (wrongful conception or pregnancy)
178 See G. Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for "Wrongful Life," I ISR. L. REv. 513, 517-18
(1966).
179 Id. at 518; see also Curlender ex rel. Curlender v. Bio-Sci. Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477,
488 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (explaining that children may hold parents liable in certain cir-
cumstances); Harriton, 226 C.L.R. 52 at paras. 205, 250 (Callinan,J., concurring); McKay v.
Essex Area Health Auth., [1982] 1 Q.B. 1166, 1181, 1188 (Eng. C.A.); DonnaJ. Long, A
Cause of Action for "Wrongful Lie": Pennsylvania's Judicial and Legislative Reaction, 26 DuQ. L.
REv. 967, 992-93 (1988) (noting concern that a wrongful life cause of action will impose a
duty on parents to terminate "less-than-perfect" fetuses).
180 See, e.g., Edwards v. Blomeley, (2002) N.S.W.S.C. 460, para. 119 (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/supreme_ct/2002/460.html; McKay, I Q.B. at
1188 (Ackner, L.J., concurring); Long, supra note 179, at 993.
181 Cf Hastings ex rel. Hastings v. Hastings, 163 A.2d 147, 149-50 (N.J. 1960), overruled
by France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 267 A.2d 490 (N.J. 1970).
182 See CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS 187 (Anthony M. Dugdale et al. eds., 18th ed.
2000).
183 See, e.g., Edwards, N.S.W.S.C. 460 at para. 119.
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poses an even greater danger to the child's feelings. This type of ac-
tion is based on the claim that the parents did not want their off-
spring, and it is easy to imagine the destructive effect of such a
statement on a small child.
The third alleged consequence of recognizing the child's right of
action against the parents is its inimical effect on parental procreative
autonomy. Imposing liability on the parents for bringing a disabled
child into the world interferes with their discretion regarding
parenthood and, at the very least, violates their right to privacy. 18 4
Do these implications justify excluding parental liability in tort?
In my view, the desire to protect the integrity of the family unit cannot
automatically preclude a tort action against a family member just as it
does not preclude enforcement of family-law rights or recovery for
breach of contractual obligations between family members. In addi-
tion, the actual causing of harm by a close family member may be far
more inimical to regular family life than the litigation occurring in its
wake. For example, it would be ludicrous to bar a person who en-
dured physical violence or psychological harassment by a family mem-
ber from filing an action solely to prevent an intrafamilial dispute. 85
With regard to the child's welfare, the starting point should be
that granting an injured party a right of action against the tortfeasor
serves the interests of the former more than the denial of such a right.
It serves the interests of the specific victim by compensating, at least in
part, for the injury. And it serves the interests of all potential victims
by deterring potential injurers from future misconduct. Combining
these two considerations would have similar effects where the injured
party is a child and the tortfeasor is a parent. In fact, the child's
unique material and emotional dependence on a parent should justify
extending-not restricting-the parent's duty of care to the child.
The emotional effect of injury caused by a person whose devotion is
the cornerstone of the child's life is immeasurably graver than that of
equivalent injury that a stranger causes. While in principle a child's
right of action against a parent may become a tool wielded by one
parent against the other in an interspousal dispute, if it emerges that
the action does not genuinely serve the child's best interests, a court
can certainly strike such an action in limine.
We are thus left with the unwillingness to interfere with procrea-
tive autonomy. As distinct from the desire to protect familial integrity
and the child's well-being, the need to prevent interference with pro-
184 See infta note 187 and accompanying text.
185 Cf Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New Lan-
guage of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. Pirr. L. REV. 1111, 1165-72 (1999) (discussing the
erosion of the "family autonomy" principle in the contexts of domestic violence and child
abuse).
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creative autonomy is not relevant to all types of child-parent litigation.
It applies only to claims based on a decision to procreate. In the
landmark Israeli Zeitsov case, Justice Ben-Porat wrote that parental dis-
cretion is not unlimited: "[i]t suffices for [the court] to leave the par-
ents with broad discretion, but if under particular circumstances there
is a moral obligation to avoid giving birth-a different conclusion may
be reached."' 8 6 The inevitable inference is that the parents' decision
to procreate may in principle provide the basis for a tort action by
their children. I do not accept this view. Can there be circumstances
where there is a moral obligation to avoid childbirth? Can we obligate
parents to avoid procreation, and perhaps even to abort their fetus,
against their will, against the dictates of their conscience, or in viola-
tion of their religious beliefs? I am skeptical as to whether a liberal
Western jurisprudence can countenance any circumstances that could
justify such blatant infringement of prospective parents' rights.8 7 In
the absence of any satisfactory explanation, I am not convinced that
one can curtail procreative discretion in a manner that will enable a
child to sue the parents for giving her birth.188 However, I need not
decide the scope of procreative autonomy here because the two-tiered
argument against liability for wrongful life fails at the first stage.
Whether special reasons militate against imposing liability on the
parents for deciding to give birth to a severely disabled child should
not affect third parties' liability for enabling such birth. No direct
analogy between parental liability and third-party liability is necessary,
even if the complained-of consequence is the same. If certain consid-
erations justify a distinction between various classes of wrongdoers,
186 CA 512/81 Zeitsov v. Katz [1986] IsrSC 40(2) 85, 98.
187 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)
("[F] reedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liber-
ties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child."); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (noting that the right to have
offspring is "one of the basic civil rights of man"). I am aware ofJohn Stuart Mill's observa-
tion that "[i]t is still unrecognized that to bring a child into existence without a fair pros-
pect of being able, not only to provide food for its body but instruction for its mind, is a
moral crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and against society." John Harris, The
Wrong of Wrongful Life, 17J.L. & Soc'y 90, 90 (1990) (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON Lri-
ERTY (1859)). But, this does not conform to prevailing views in Western societies.
188 Cf Alexander M. Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 618,
661-66 (1979) (discussing the difficulties of creating a right of action for genetically im-
paired children against their parents); Anthony Jackson, Action for Wrongful Life, Wrongful
Pregnancy, and Wrongful Birth in the United States and England, 17 Lov. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 535, 559 (1995) ("A woman's choice to give birth to a child ... should always be
[viewed as] reasonable."); Joan Waters, Wrongful Life: The Implications of Suits in Wrongful
Life Brought by Children Against Their Parents, 31 DRAKE L. REv. 411, 415-25, 432
(1981-1982) (explaining that an affirmative duty to abort is irreconcilable with Supreme
Court precedent regarding a woman's right to privacy).
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nothing precludes us from giving them legal effect. 189 The definition
of the notional duty of care considers not only the type of injury, the
types of victims, and the types of events but also the types of injur-
ers. °90 The concept is flexible and accommodates differentiation be-
tween the various categories of injurers in accordance with the
dictates of legal policy.
b. A Duty to Kill the Fetus
Certain opponents of liability for wrongful life argue that recog-
nizing the child's cause of action where the consultant's misconduct
occurred after conception is tantamount to imposing a duty to kill the
fetus. 191 These opponents claim that when parents declare their in-
tention to terminate pregnancy should the fetus be found defective,
the consultant realizes that disclosing the existence of a defect will
impel the parents to an abortion; if the law compels disclosure of that
information, it effectively binds the consultant to cause the death of
the fetus.' 92 This "duty," the argument goes, is inconsistent with the
principle of the sanctity of life. 193 It is also repugnant to the freedom
of conscience because it forces consultants who morally oppose abor-
tions to act against the dictates of their consciences.
However, this argument cannot stand. First and most impor-
tantly, the consultant's duty is to perform the examinations with com-
petence and reasonable care. The consultant is under no obligation
to perform an abortion even if the consultant is professionally compe-
tent to perform the procedure and the parents desire it. 194 Second,
the consultant's professional opinion is not the final word. Transmit-
ting information about the existence of a certain defect does not auto-
189 See Harriton ex rel. Harriton v. Stephens, (2006) 226 C.L.R. 52, para. 132 (Austl.)
(Kirby, J., dissenting), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2006/15.
html ("U]ust because it is held that a wrongful life action lies against a negligent health
care provider, it does not necessarily follow that such an action would lie against the
mother .... If this Court were to hold that a wrongful life action existed in the present
proceedings against the respondent, that decision would say nothing at all about whether
such an action lay against the mother.");Jane E.S. Fortin, Is the "Wrongful Life" Action Really
Dead?,J. Soc. WELFARE L., Sept. 1987, at 306, 309-10 (describing the mother's and doctor's
disparate duties of care); cf CAL. CIv. CODE §43.6(a) (2007) ("No cause of action arises
against a parent of a child based upon the claim that the child should not have been
conceived or, if conceived, should not have been allowed to have been born alive.").
190 See Harriton, 226 C.L.R. 52 at para. 132 (Kirby, J., dissenting).
191 See, e.g., McKay v. Essex Area Health Auth., [1982] 1 Q.B. 1166, 1178-79 (Eng.
C.A.) (Stephenson, L.J., concurring).
192 Cf id. (discussing the doctor's possible duties of care).
193 See JOHN KEOWN, EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPEC-
TIVES 128 (1995) ("[T]he principle of the sanctity of life is... the principle of the inviola-
bility of innocent human life .... ").
194 Cf Abortion Act, 1967, c. 87, § 4(1) (Eng.) ("[N]o person shall be under any
duty... to participate in any treatment authorised by this Act to which he has a conscien-
tious objection . . ").
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matically lead to the termination of pregnancy. The prospective
parents must still make an informed decision to terminate the preg-
nancy on the basis of the information at their disposal. 195 We cannot
construe the consultant's duty as a duty to kill the fetus if the dis-
charge of that duty does not necessarily lead to abortion.196 Third,
regarding the violation of the consultant's freedom of conscience,
perhaps a person who opposes abortion should not engage in a pro-
fession whose entire essence is to provide information that facilitates
decisions regarding termination of pregnancies.
c. Protective Medicine and Multiplicity of Abortions
A ubiquitous claim is that recognizing wrongful life actions may
cause both doctors and genetic consultants to give overly cautious ad-
vice to expectant parents to minimize the likelihood of liability, result-
ing in a proliferation of abortions of healthy fetuses. The English Law
Commission expressed this concern in its 1974 Report on Injuries to
Unborn Children, in the wake of which the Congenital Disabilities Act
was passed. 197 Opponents of liability made similar arguments during
the controversy that erupted in France prior to the passage of the law
barring wrongful life suits. 198 Ultrasonographers claimed that be-
cause their examinations could not provide definite results, the readi-
ness of the Cour de cassation to subject them to liability for failing to
discover congenital defects could lead them to recommend an abor-
tion even if the likelihood of a defect were slim. 199
These claims regarding protective medicine are refutable in two
ways. First, failure to discover a defect cannot per se result in tort
liability.200 If the consultant acted as a reasonable consultant under
the circumstances, the consultant would not be liable, even if he or
she failed to discover the defect.20 1 Naturally, when adjudicating the
195 Cf Harriton, 226 C.L.R. 52 at para. 112 (KirbyJ., dissenting) ("It would be impossi-
ble to comply with any such duty considering that medical practitioners can never compel
an expectant mother to undergo an abortion. . . . If a mother chooses to continue a
pregnancy or to conceive in the first place where a proper ... warning has been given, that
is her decision to make.").
196 Cf id.
197 See INJURIES TO UNBORN CHILDREN, supra note 89, at 34 ("Such a cause of action, if it
existed, would place an almost intolerable burden on medical advisers in their socially and
morally exacting role. The danger that doctors would be under subconscious pressures to
advise abortions in doubtful cases through fear of an action for damages is, we think, a real
one."); see also CA 512/81 Zeitsov v. Katz [1986] IsrSC 40(2) 85, 129 (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting).
198 See BBC NEWS, supra note 137.
199 See id.
200 See KErON ET AL., supra note 156, at 164-65.
201 See Azzolino ex rel. Azzolino v. Dingfielder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 538 (N.C. 1985) (Exum,
J., dissenting) ("A physician's responsibility is simply to exercise due care to provide the
information necessary for the patient to make an informed decision. If physicians do this,
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negligence question, a court will take into account scientific and tech-
nological limits and any uncertainties that are inherent in medical
and quasi-medical examinations. As a result, the fear of liability in
every case in which an examination fails to disclose a defect is
unjustified.
Second, if the consultant's excessive caution leads to a healthy
child being aborted, the parents may recover for damages incurred
thereby. 20 2 In certain jurisdictions, the child's estate likewise may re-
cover for pecuniary, and occasionally even nonpecuniary, damages. 2013
The fear of liability for "wrongful abortion" provides a certain incen-
tive against giving overly cautious advice. 20 4 Admittedly, this incentive
is somewhat limited because the probability of discovering and prov-
ing negligence in wrongful abortion cases is clearly lower than the
probability of discovering and proving negligence in wrongful life
cases, and because the burden imposed on a person found responsi-
ble for wrongful abortion is not equivalent to the burden that awaits
that person if found responsible for wrongful birth and life.20 5 Given
the immense importance of the endangered interest-the public in-
terest in the protection of potential life-I contend elsewhere that the
sanction for wrongful abortion ought to be stiffer. 20 6 But no one can
deny that, even now, there is a legal incentive to refrain from giving
overly cautious advice that might lead to an unwarranted abortion,
which is further supplemented by the fear of reputational harm.
d. Actions Based on Social, Legal, and Economic Disabilities
Opponents of wrongful life claims further argue that allowing
these claims may open the gates to a multitude of actions that derive
from all types of social, legal, and even economic inferiority ("unsatis-
factory life").207 Where discrimination on the basis of, for example,
race, religion, gender, or nationality plagues society, people belong-
ing to those groups might file actions in tort against those responsible
for their birth.
they need not fear a lawsuit if parents bear . . . a child with congenital defects."); Carel
JJ.M. Stolker, Wrongful Life: The Limits of Liability and Beyond, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 521,
533-34 (1994).
202 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 810 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1993); Breyne v. Potter,
574 S.E.2d 916 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); Baker v. Gordon, 759 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988);
Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Med. Ctr., 512 N.E.2d 538 (N.Y. 1987). For a de-
tailed analysis of the parental claims for "wrongful abortion," see Ronen Perry & Yehuda
Adar, Wrongful Abortion: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'' L. & ETHICS
507, 517-23 (2005).
203 See Perry & Adar, supra note 202, at 525-37.
204 See id. at 545.
205 See id. at 545-47.
206 See id. at 547-84 (evaluating the effectiveness of various criminal and civil penalties
on doctors as "wrongful abortion" deterrents).
207 See, e.g., CA 512/81 Zeitsov v. Katz [1986] IsrSC 40(2) 85, 100.
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Justice Ben-Porat refuted this argument in the Israeli case of Zeit-
sov. She argued that "[t]here is no fear that. . . a minor's action based
on having been born to parents of an inferior race will be recog-
nized .... [R]ecognition of such a claim would be . . .contrary to
public policy and to the deeply rooted moral values of our society." z 8
Put differently, she believed that there was a substantive difference
between wrongful life claims and unsatisfactory life claims in terms of
the appropriate policy-a difference that may justify a categorical le-
gal distinction.2 0 9
But what makes unsatisfactory life claims so markedly different?
Conceivably, Justice Ben-Porat intended that a Western society could
not tolerate discrimination based on race, gender, nationality, etc.
Considering her argument, any claim that a particular group is infer-
ior to another group is contrary to "public policy and to the deeply
rooted moral values of our society," and, as such, cannot be grounds
for an actionable right.2 t However, this argument ignores the fact
that all Western societies encompass groups that suffer repression de-
spite the formal equality in law.2 1 1 In some jurisdictions, certain
groups face discrimination from the legal system itself 2 1 2 If it is clear
that discrimination exists, I see no reason for rejecting it as the basis
for a civil action even if it may portray the state negatively.
Alternatively, Justice Ben-Porat may have intended that given the
principle of the sanctity of life, the claim that a social, legal, or eco-
nomic deficiency may make life inferior to nonexistence "contradicts
public policy and the deeply rooted moral values of our society."2 13
However, this argument does not justify a categorical distinction be-
tween wrongful life claims and unsatisfactory life claims because it ap-
plies with equal force to each. If the principle of the sanctity of life
precludes the argument that life may be inferior to nonexistence, we
should reject wrongful life claims at the outset for lack of injury, re-
gardless of the prospects of unsatisfactory life claims.2 1 4 Accordingly,
208 Id. at 100.
209 Cf Curlender ex rel. Curlender v. Bio-Sci. Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 486 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980) ("[T]here is a world of difference between an unwanted healthy child who is
illegitimate . .. and the severely deformed infant plaintiff ..
210 Zeitsov, [1986] lsrSC 40(2) at 100.
211 For example, women receive lower salaries than men for identical work. See, e.g.,
Amelia K. Duroska, Note, Comparable Work, Comparable Pay: Rethinking the Decision of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Em-
ployees v. Washington, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 245, 245-46 (1986); Donna E. Young, Working
Across Borders: Global Restructuring and Women's Work, 2001 UTAH L. REv. 1, 3.
212 For example, children born of a prohibited relationship under Jewish law
(mamzerim), suffer from various restrictions under Israeli law. See Joel A. Nichols, Multi-
Tiered Marriage: Ideas and Influences from New York and Louisiana to the International Commu-
nity, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 135, 155 (2007).
213 Zeitsov, [1986] IsrSC 40(2) at 100.
214 See infra Part II.C.2.
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the policy argument based on the fear of opening the floodgates is
redundant.
Still, I would set aside this policy argument for a different reason.
I agree with the opponents of wrongful life claims that if courts al-
lowed such claims, unsatisfactory life claims might follow; but I do not
consider this to be an adverse outcome. Grave social deficiencies may
be as devastating to a person's well-being as physical defects. For ex-
ample, the life of a person who, as a member of a depressed sector, is
unable to acquire education, receive benefits and services from public
authorities, work and earn a fair salary, own property, or participate in
elections, is no better than that of a person suffering from serious
physical disability. I am not convinced that there is ajustification for a
sweeping distinction between unsatisfactory life and wrongful life ac-
tions. So the fact that allowing liability for wrongful life may en-
courage actions for unsatisfactory life cannot in itself justify exclusion
of liability for wrongful life. Moreover, I do not think that we should
expect a deluge of unsatisfactory life actions, provided that courts
judge these actions by the same criteria applied to wrongful life
claims, particularly the need to show extreme suffering.215
e. An Increase in Insurance Premiums and the Costs of Medical
Services
One of the common arguments against liability in tort for wrong-
ful life is that allowing liability may significantly increase the insurance
premiums paid by obstetricians, ultrasonographers, genetic consul-
tants, and the like. 2 16 Increased insurance costs not only impose a
heavy economic burden on the pregnancy consultants but also reduce
the motivation of others to specialize and work in that field.
The response to this argument is quite simple. Tort liability inevi-
tably imposes an economic burden on the tortfeasor. 21 7 If the fact
that tort liability imposes an economic burden on the defendant
could justify its negation, no liability would ever accrue. We do not
exempt attorneys from liability for damages that their professional
negligence does to clients, nor do we exempt negligent surgeons from
liability for injuries to their patients, even though in both cases impos-
ing liability on these professionals increases the premiums paid to in-
215 See Deana A. Pollard, Wrongful Analysis in Wrongful Life Jurisprudence, 55 ALA. L. REv.
327, 352-53 (2004) (explaining that some courts have indicated that pain and suffering
could be the sole basis for a wrongful life claim).
216 See Long, supra note 179, at 993; see also BBC NEWS, supra note 137.
217 See Alexee Deep Conroy, Note, Lessons Learned from the "Laboratories of Democracy" : A
Critique of Federal Medical Liability Reform, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 1159, 1167 (2006) ("[H]igh
malpractice premiums disastrously reduce the availability of care in certain areas and
within certain specialties because premium costs are too high for physicians to remain in
practice.").
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surers.21 8 Similarly, the anticipated increase in insurance payments
should not justify negating liability in the case under discussion. Fur-
thermore, it seems to me that the clients themselves will ultimately
bear any increase in insurance costs, and thus the consultants' finan-
cial situation will not substantively worsen.2 19
Consequently, some may argue that raised consultancy fees occa-
sioned by the rise in insurance premiums would harm potential par-
ents because, as prices for services increase, the ability to consume
them decreases. If prices go up, potential parents will be unable to
receive all the information that they need to make informed decisions
regarding procreation. 220 A somewhat related argument is that in-
creased consultancy costs would reduce the number of examinations,
leading to an increase in the number of congenitally disabled chil-
dren. This means that allowing recovery by disabled persons may ef-
fectively increase the number of people born into lives of misery.2 2 1
Furthermore, some may argue that the increased number of people
born with severe defects places a heavy burden on the health system
and on the public coffers. 2 22
These arguments are unconvincing. In many cases, imposing lia-
bility on manufacturers or service providers in respect of harmed con-
sumers leads to an increase in the price of their products or
services.223 Negating liability for that reason alone renders impossible
the imposition of liability on manufacturers or providers of services
for harms that they cause to consumers, at least as long as we consider
the consumption of their products or services desirable. Negating lia-
bility by reason of the anticipated increase in the prices of products
produced or services supplied by the tortfeasor would sound the
death knell for products liability and professional liability, and such a
result is unacceptable.
218 See id.
219 See H. Richard Beresford, The Health Security Act: Coercion and Distrust for the Market,
79 CORNELL L. REV. 1405, 1418 (1994) ("If they can, employers will pass on their raised
insurance costs to the public in the form of higher prices.").
220 Cf Heather S. Dixon, Pelvic Exam Prerequisite to Hormonal Contraceptives: Unjustified
Infringement on Constitutional Rights, Governmental Coercion, and Bad Public Policy, 27 HARv.
WOMEN'S L.J. 177, 222-23 (2004) (explaining the costs and difficulties for some women of
receiving care during an unplanned pregnancy).
221 Needless to say, children born with disabilities that have gone undetected due to
the parents' inability to afford preconception and prenatal examinations would not have a
defendant to sue for their suffering.
222 See Serena Gordon, Birth Defects Cost US. Billions, HEALTHDAY, Jan. 26, 2007, http://
www.healthfinder.gov/news/newsstory.asp?docD=601 329.
223 See, e.g., Patrick J. Norton, What Happens When Air Bags Kill: Automobile Manufactur-
ers'Liabilityfor Injuries Caused by Air Bags, 48 CASE W. Rs. L. REv. 659, 681 (1998) (explain-
ing that automobile manufacturers spread loss through increased prices and liability
insurance).
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In addition, the higher prices that imposing liability causes may
be desirable. If the production cost of a certain service does not in-
clude expected harm to consumers, then the private cost of produc-
tion is lower than its social cost. This may result in excessive
production. Imposing liability will not cause market failure by reduc-
ing production to a suboptimal level; it will rectify a market failure
through internalization of the social cost of production. 224
With regard to the unavailability of relevant information to pro-
spective parents, I should note that increasing consultation prices
would not cause potential parents altogether to waive examinations
intended to show the likelihood of the birth of a disabled child. 225 At
most, it would lead them to waive examinations to detect relatively
mild or rare defects. 226 Even today, due to the prohibitive costs, po-
tential parents do not undergo tests that cover all possible congenital
defects. Increasing the prices of examinations might simply induce
expectant parents to be more circumspect regarding the tests that
they choose to undergo. Logically, they would not skip a test aimed to
detect a severe disability whose likelihood is not negligible 227 even if
the price rose considerably. Ultimately, preconception and prenatal
tests are limited in number and not prohibitively expensive, and the
need for them arises relatively rarely.2 28 In some countries, a national
health system supplies them free of charge or at subsidized rates.229
The claim that the rise in consultancy fees would increase the
number of disabled people is also problematic. First, it is quite specu-
lative. I have already explained that potential parents would not waive
the tests that detect severe defects even if the prices of examinations
increased. In that case, the number of people born into "lives of mis-
ery" whose needs would impose a heavy burden on public funds
224 See Michael J. Miller, Strict Liability, Negligence and the Standard of Care for Transfusion-
Transmitted Disease, 36 ARIz. L. REv. 473, 504-06 (1994) (explaining the concept of cost
internalization in the products-liability context).
225 Cf Nancy Press & C.H. Browner, Risk, Autonomy, and Responsibility: Informed Consent
for Prenatal Testing, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1995, at S9, S1l-S12 (explaining that
women take certain prenatal tests for purposes of "reassurance" and to "do everything
[they can] to help [themselves] and the baby").
226 See id.
227 For example, many hereditary diseases are far more frequent in certain groups
than in others. Under those circumstances, a consultant will only perform the relevant
tests when the parents belong to a high-risk group. See, e.g., Connor, supra note 5, at 3.
228 In Western societies, the number of pregnancies per family is usually small. See
Christopher Tietze, Pregnancy Rates and Birth Rates, 16 POPULATION STUD. 31, 35 (1962)
(explaining that in some Western countries, most couples use contraception and thus only
have two to three children). Moreover, parents likely seek preconception genetic counsel-
ing only once, as the parents' genetic structures do not change.
229 See Kaisa Raatikainen et al., Good Outcome of Teenage Pregnancies in High-Quality Ma-
ternity Care, 16 EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 157, 160 (2006) ("In some countries maternity care is
provided free of charge .... "), available at http://eurpub.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/
16/2/157.
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would not change dramatically. Furthermore, this claim reflects a
chilling perspective on the value of life with disability. It evokes the
feeling that society would prefer a world in which disabled people are
not even born. The desire to prevent a "life of suffering" implies a
collective decision on a matter that cannot be a subject for a collective
decision: when is life so miserable that the individual would prefer to
forgo it? The desire to save the high costs of treating a severely dis-
abled person by preventing that person's birth implies that a disabled
person is an unwanted societal burden.
f. Interim Summary
So far I have endeavored to show that policy considerations do
not support the blanket rejection of tort liability for wrongful life.
This might conclude our discussion of legal policy because, while pol-
icy factors may negate or limit the duty of care, it is unnecessary to
positively support such a duty's existence by policy factors.
230
Still, some claim that weighty considerations favor imposing liabil-
ity for wrongful life. For example, we may deem imposing liability on
a negligent consultant necessary to encourage consultants to exercise
the requisite degree of care. 23 ' In my view, this claim is indecisive
because recognizing the parents' right of action for wrongful birth
creates a certain incentive to exercise reasonable care in preconcep-
tion and prenatal consultation. Presumably, the marginal deterrent
effect of allowing an additional action by the child would not be signif-
icant in most cases.
Another possible argument is that the child's action is a crucial
means of preventing human suffering. Put differently, the unfortu-
nate child should not be left without a remedy to ameliorate the suf-
fering.232 In my view, however, the need to mitigate the child's pain
cannot in itself justify liability. Tort law is not a panacea for all the
suffering in the world; it focuses on cases where the wrongdoing of a
particular defendant caused harm to a particular victim. 233 I will en-
deavor to show that, in a typical wrongful life claim, the defendant's
230 Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 156, § 7(b) ("In exceptional cases,
when an articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting liability
in a particular class of cases, a court may decide that the defendant has no duty or that the
ordinary duty of reasonable care requires modification.").
23 1 See, e.g., Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 496 (Wash. 1983) ("Imposi-
tion of a ... duty to the child will similarly foster the societal objectives of genetic counsel-
ing and prenatal testing, and will discourage malpractice."); Dawe, supra note 159, at
491-92; Pollard, supra note 215, at 339, 367.
232 See Pollard, supra note 215, at 337 (explaining that the goal of tort law is compensa-
tion for social wrongdoing and intangible harms).
233 See Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law,
74 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 1431, 1457 (2000) ("[T]raditional American tort litigation revolves
around a particular victim seeking compensation from a particular injurer .... ).
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wrongdoing has not caused damage to the plaintiff and thus the de-
fendant cannot be subject to liability even if the plaintiff leads a life of
horrible suffering. I believe that the remedy for suffering that does
not arise from wrongful conduct must come from social-welfare
mechanisms.
A more convincing argument concerns the notion of loss spread-
ing. The consultant's capacity to spread the loss exceeds that of the
child.2 34 A consultant can easily purchase professional-liability insur-
ance and spread the cost of insurance among clients. Effectively, this
ensures double spreading: all consultants share the actual "damage"
via the insurance system, and the individual consultant spreads the
private-insurance cost among clients through the consultancy fee. 2 35
Thus, the explanation for the universal hostility to wrongful life claims
does not stem from policy considerations.
C. Harm
1. Definition of Harm
The Second Restatement of Torts defines the term "harm," which is
sometimes referred to as "damage" or "injury," as "the existence of
loss or detriment in fact of any kind to a person resulting from any
cause."236 In other words, harm is any detrimental change in a per-
son's state. It exists if the plaintiff's state following the defendant's
substandard conduct is worse than the plaintiffs state in the absence
of that conduct.237 Comparing the two states is not only an essential
precondition for liability; it also dictates the scope of damages once
the issue of liability is no longer in question because the aim of tort
damages is to restore the victim to the pretort condition (restitutio in
integrum) 238 In a wrongful life claim, the appropriate comparison is
between life with disability (plaintiffs current condition) and nonexis-
tence (plaintiff's condition but for the defendant's carelessness).239
The crucial question is whether one can speak of a detriment when
contrasting a state of disabled existence to a state of nonexistence.
234 See Pollard, supra note 215, at 338.
235 See James M. Parker, Wrongful Life: The Child's Cause of Action for Negligent Genetic
Counseling in Texas, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 639, 674-75 (1985).
236 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(2) (1965). Note, however, that the Restate-
ment distinguishes between "harm" and "injury." See id.
237 See Harriton ex rel. Harriton v. Stephens, (2006) 226 C.L.R. 52, para. 251 (Austl.)
(Crennan, J.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2006/15.html.
238 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979); cf Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal
Co., 5 App. Cas. 25, 39 (1880) ("[I]n settling the sum of money to be given for reparation
of damages you should as nearly as possible get at that sum of money which will put the
party who has been injured.., in the same position as he would have been in if he had not
sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or reparation.").
239 See Pollard, supra note 215, at 328-29.
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2. Possible Grounds for Rejecting the Action
a. Establishing Harm Is Logically Self-Defeating
In a well-known article published in 1966, Professor Tedeschi
claimed that the harm complained of in wrongful life claims "does not
fall within the legal-and logical-meaning of the term."240 The con-
cept of harm derives from a comparison of the plaintiffs condition
following the defendant's careless conduct to the plaintiffs condition
in the absence of such conduct. For our purposes, however, "no com-
parison is possible since were it not for the act of birth the infant
would not exist. By his cause of action, the plaintiff cuts from under
himself the ground upon which he needs to rely in order to prove his
damage."24 1
We can understand this argument in two ways. One sense is that
the concept of harm premises on a comparison between two states of
existence (but for and following the negligent conduct); because non-
existence is not strictly a state of existence, it cannot operate as a basis
for comparison. 242 In my view, this interpretation is overly technical.
The other sense is that the plaintiff in a tort action requests restora-
tion to the pretort position. 24 3 Were we to restore the plaintiff to the
original position in a wrongful life claim, the plaintiff would lose legal
personality and, therefore, any possible right against the defendant. 244
To rectify the "harm," we must place the plaintiff in a position where
there is no right for compensation. In other words, a wrongful life
claim is logically self-defeating.
A critic of this line of argument posed the following question. 245
Assume that a doctor amputates a patient's leg to save the patient's
life and it subsequently transpires that the patient's life could have
been saved by a less aggressive form of treatment (e.g., antibiotics).
Can a court reject a suit against the negligent doctor on the claim that
the act of which the plaintiff complains is the very act that enabled the
patient to stay alive and file a suit? Clearly, the court would not deny
240 Tedeschi, supra note 178, at 529.
241 Id.
242 Cf JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 102 (1984) ("To be harmed is to be put in a
worse condition than one would otherwise be in (to be made 'worse off"), but if the negli-
gent act had not occurred, [the plaintiff] would not have existed at all. The creation of an
initial condition is not the worsening of a prior condition; therefore it is not a harm, no
matter how harmful it is.").
243 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 238, § 901 cmt. a.
244 Cf Jost, supra note 158, at 634 (recognizing that legal personality exists from the
point of birth in all states).
245 See Thomas Keasler Foutz, Comment, "Wrongful Life": The Right Not to Be Born, 54
TUL. L. REv. 480, 493-94 (1980).
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liability just because the defendant's negligence bestowed life to the
plaintiff.246
However, this critique fails to grasp the essence of the criticized
argument. The logical argument assumes that the plaintiff would not
have existed at all but for the defendant's negligence. This is not so in
the case of the amputated leg. True, the defendant's conduct ena-
bled the plaintiff to continue living, but had the defendant acted with
reasonable care, the plaintiff would have had a better life because his or
her leg would not have been amputated; the plaintiff would not have
forfeited her very existence. Nonetheless, I can understand why the
logical argument is not the dominant reason for denying wrongful life
claims. Courts seeking to categorically dismiss actions of a particular
sort will generally prefer to rely on more substantive argumentation.
After all, the life of the common law has not been logic-it has been
experience. 247
b. The Comparison Is Impossible
Harm is a prerequisite for liability in tort and its extent dictates
the scope of damages.248 Harm is a negative difference between the
plaintiffs condition following the defendant's misconduct and the
plaintiffs condition in the absence of such conduct.249 Thus, estab-
lishing harm entails a comparison between these two conditions.
One of the most frequent arguments in case law and legal schol-
arship is that wrongful life actions must fail because it is impossible to
compare life with disability (the posttort condition) and nonexistence
(the pretort condition).25° The difference between life and nonlife is
a metaphysical matter, extending beyond the limits of human knowl-
edge. Life and nonlife do not have a common denominator that can
be used as a basis for comparison. Hence, harm cannot be estab-
lished, and no liability can ensue. The Supreme Court of New Jersey
made this point in the seminal case of Gleitman v. Cosgrove: "The in-
fant plaintiff would have us measure the difference between his life
with defects against the utter void of nonexistence, but it is impossible
to make such a determination. This Court cannot weigh the value of
life with impairments against the nonexistence of life itself."251
Fifteen years later, Lord Ackner expressed a similar view in the
judgment of the English Court of Appeal in Mckay: "[H]ow can a
court begin to evaluate non-existence, 'the undiscovered country from
246 See id.
247 OLIVER WENDELL HOLmES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
248 See RESTATEMENTr (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 238, § 901(a).
249 See id. § 901 cmt. a.
250 See Pollard, supra note 215, at 328-29.
251 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967).
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whose bourn no traveler returns?' No comparison is possible and
therefore no damage can be established which a court would
recognise. This goes to the root of the whole cause of action." 252
Numerous courts and scholars endorse this view. 25 3 Admittedly,
it has attracted several critiques; yet, none is persuasive. The first criti-
cism leveled against this line of argument appears in Judge Jacob's
minority opinion in Gleitman. Judge Jacob argued that, as courts cope
with difficulties in quantifying damages on a daily basis, especially
when nonpecuniary losses are concerned, they can overcome such dif-
ficulties in wrongful life cases as well. It is unjust to exempt a negli-
gent party from liability purely due to difficulties in measuring the
extent of harm. 254
I agree that difficulty assessing damages arising primarily-but
not solely-with regard to nonpecuniary losses should not deter
courts from imposing liability. However, we must distinguish between
cases in which the existence of harm is obvious even though an assess-
ment of its scope is difficult and cases where it is impossible to deter-
mine whether harm actually occurred. Our familiarity with different
states of existence enables us to compare them and identify a change
for the worse in a person's life. When we need to compare two states
of existence, the question of harm is not an insoluble mystery. The
only problem is one of quantification, but inasmuch as it arises only
252 [1982] 1 Q.B. 1166, 1189 (Eng. C.A.).
253 See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978) ("Whether it is better
never to have been born at all than to have been born with even gross deficiencies is a
mystery more properly to be left to the philosophers and the theologians."); see also Lin-
inger ex rel. Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1210 (Colo. 1988) ("[A] person's exis-
tence, however handicapped it may be, does not constitute a legally cognizable injury
relative to non-existence."); Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of Del. Inc., 581 A.2d 288, 293-94 (Del.
1989) (noting the impossibility of "identifying damages based on a comparison between
life in the child's impaired state and nonexistence"); Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 423
(Fla. 1992) ("Clearly, the relative value of human existence over human nonexistence is
not a matter cognizable under Florida tort law."); Blake ex rel. Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315,
322 (Idaho 1984), superseded by statute, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-334 (West 2004), as recognized
in Vanvooren v. Astin, 111 P.3d 125 (Idaho 2005) ("Blake has suffered no legally cogniza-
ble wrong by being born ...."); Goldberg v. Ruskin, 499 N.E.2d 406, 409-410 (Ill. 1986)
(declining to recognize a claim of wrongful life due to the "intractable problem of assess-
ing damages"); Greco ex rel. Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 347-48 (Nev. 1995)
(calling the wrongful life damages assessment "a calculation the courts are incapable of
performing"); Harriton ex rel. Harriton v. Stephens, (2006) 226 C.L.R. 52, para. 252
(Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2006/15.html ("A
comparison between a life with disabilities and non-existence . . .is impossible."); Kearl,
supra note 79, at 1286 ("[I]t is impossible to establish that the [wrongful life] plaintiff has
suffered harm."). But see Speck ex rel. Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 115 (Pa. 1979),
superseded by statute, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305 (West 2007); cf Bader v.Johnson, 675
N.E.2d 1119 (Ind. 1997) (rejecting the "hyper-scholastic rationale" that wrongful life
claims should be denied due to the impossibility of calculating damages).
254 See Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 704; see also Dawe, supra note 159, at 491; Mark Strasser,
Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, Wrongful Death, and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Can Reasonable
Jurisdictions Recognize All But One?, 64 Mo. L. REV. 29, 55-56 (1999).
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after the question of liability has been decided, it cannot justify the
negation of liability. The wrongful life setting clearly differs. To com-
pare existence with nonexistence we need to ascertain the value of life
itself (which is lost in the case of nonexistence), regardless of any
pleasure or pain that a specific plaintiff endures. This, of course, is an
impossible task. The problem is not just one of quantification.2 55
Several proponents of liability for wrongful life suggested valuing
the state of nonexistence as "zero," which denotes the absence of any
pain and any pleasure. 256 The next stage is to compare the plaintiff's
current condition-according to a calculation of pain versus plea-
sure-with the "zero" baseline. If the aggregate suffering exceeds the
aggregate pleasures, harm is established.257 Though alluring at first
blush, this approach is deficient because it presupposes, albeit ele-
gantly, what needs to be proved, namely that life has no intrinsic value
aside from that of net pleasures. Even if we concur that a plaintiffs
suffering vastly exceeds pleasure in the current condition, this cannot
compel the conclusion that the plaintiff suffered harm because proof
of harm requires a comparison between the current condition and the
state of nonexistence. In the latter, there are undeniably no pleasures
and no pains, but there is also no life.
Proponents of liability for wrongful life argue that refusal to com-
pare disabled life with nonexistence is unjust insofar as similar com-
parisons are acceptable in other areas of tort law.2 58 For example, in
cases of bodily injury, life with disability (A) is compared with normal
life (B), while in cases of wrongful death, nonexistence (C) is com-
pared with normal life (B). The ability to compare objects or values is
transitive (in the mathematical sense). According to this argument, if
we can compare between A and B and between B and C, then a com-
parison between A and C is also possible. So, theoretically, nothing
prevents the comparison of disabled life (A) with nonexistence (C).259
However, this argument suffers from a mistaken conception of
liability for wrongful death. The dependents of the immediate victim
bring the primary action in cases of death, and the resulting damages
express the dependents' personal losses. 260 A court need not com-
pare existence and nonexistence.
255 See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 929 (Tex. 1984) ("[It] is not fatal to a cause
of action in negligence that a plaintiff cannot prove the quantum of injury; but a plaintiff
must always establish the existence of injury. This is an impossible burden for a 'wrongful
life' plaintiff to meet.").
256 See Foutz, supra note 245, at 497 (citing Note, A Cause ofAction for "Wrongful Life : [A
Suggested Analysis], 55 MiucN. L. REv. 58, 66 (1970)).
257 See id. at 497-98; Pollard, supra note 215, at 355-56; Strasser, supra note 254, at 63.
258 See Capron, supra note 188, at 649.
259 See id.; Parker, supra note 235, at 672.
260 See Perry & Adar, supra note 202, at 530-35.
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A thornier question arises with respect to an action brought by
the personal representative of the deceased for the latter's losses. Sev-
eral jurisdictions allow the estate to recover for the loss of the victim's
ability to enjoy life. 26 1 Prima facie, determining such damages re-
quires comparing life and nonexistence. In my view, however, this has
no bearing on wrongful life claims for three reasons. First, in cases of
wrongful death, mostjurisdictions do not allow recovery for loss of the
enjoyment of life. Recovery is, therefore, an anomaly.262 This casts
some doubt on the practicability of the underlying comparison. Sec-
ond, compensation for the loss of enjoyment of life, as its name at-
tests, compensates for loss of enjoyment-not for the loss of life
itself.2 63 Such compensation does not require a comparison between
life and its absence but rather a comparison between enjoyment and
its absence. The calculus does not account for the intrinsic value of
life. Third, even if courts were to award compensation for the loss of
life itself and not only for the loss of enjoyment, 264 this would not
improve a wrongful life claim's chances of success. Quite the opposite
is true; if courts allowed recovery for loss of life in every case of death,
we could say that the right to recover for loss of life expressed an
unqualified preference for life over nonexistence, thereby removing
any basis for an action for wrongful life.
Proponents of liability for wrongful life assert that recognizing
the liberty to abort a defective fetus (eugenic abortion) expresses pref-
erence for nonexistence over life with disabilities, and if that conclu-
sion is permissible in one area of the law, it may be permitted in
another.26 5 In my view, this claim is fallacious. The liberty to abort a
fetus is not contingent on the superiority of nonexistence to life with
disability. The liberty to abort does not protect the interest of the
fetus-it protects the autonomy of the pregnant woman. 26 6 Although
the expected suffering of the child may be one of the considerations
that the prospective mother weighs in making her decision, it need
not be the decisive one. She may, for example, base her decision on
261 See, e.g., Ozaki v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay, 954 P.2d 652,
667-68 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998); Choctaw Maid Farms, Inc. v. Hailey, 822 So. 2d 911, 922-23
(Miss. 2002); Romero v. Byers, 872 P.2d 840, 846 (N.M. 1994); see also Tina M. Tabacchi,
Note, Hedonic Damages: A New Trend in Compensation, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 331, 331-36 (1991)
(discussing the nature and availability of hedonic damages).
262 See Perry & Adar, supra note 202, at 535-36 n.129.
263 See, e.g., McGee v. A C & S, Inc., 933 So. 2d 770, 774-75 (La. 2006) (describing
damages for loss of enjoyment of life); 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 231 (2007) (recognizing
that loss of enjoyment of life is a separate element of damages in some jurisdictions).
264 This may be the case in Arkansas. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-101(b) (2005) ("[A]
decedent's estate may recover for the decedent's loss of life as an independent element of
damages."); Durham v. Marberry, 156 S.W.3d 242, 248-49 (Ark. 2004).
265 See Harvey Teff, The Action for "Wrongful Life" in England and the United States, 34
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 423, 433 (1985).
266 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-55 (1973).
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the physical, emotional, and economic burden involved in raising a
disabled child. 267 Even if the woman decides to terminate the preg-
nancy because she truly believes that the child's impairment would
render the child's life worse than nonexistence, the law would give
effect to her subjective decision without evaluating its objective valid-
ity. The objective validity of this decision cannot be ascertained.
A more plausible argument in support of liability for wrongful life
pertains to the legal treatment of requests for euthanasia. Some claim
that recognizing the right of a terminally ill person to forgo life-pro-
longing medical treatment 268 necessitates a decision that nonexis-
tence is preferable to life in pain. They say that if a principled
decision is possible in euthanasia cases, it is likewise possible in wrong-
ful life cases. 269 This claim, admittedly, has a certain appeal. How-
ever, I think that a clear distinction exists between requests for
euthanasia and wrongful life claims.
In a euthanasia case, the court is not required to objectively rule
on the relationship between life in pain and nonexistence; rather, the
court gives effect to the petitioner's subjective will 2 70 (although in cer-
tain cases that will is expressed by a guardian).271 On the other hand,
in a wrongful life claim, the court does not attempt to protect a per-
son's right to prefer nonexistence to painful life but rather to deter-
mine whether the defendant's misconduct caused harm to the
plaintiff. This requires an objective comparison between nonexis-
tence and life with disability.272 Moreover, in a euthanasia case, the
267 Cf Harriton ex rel. Harriton v. Stephens, (2006) 226 C.L.R. 52, para. 247 (Austi.)
(Crennan, J.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2006/15.html
("The law does not require that considerations of the mother's physical and mental health,
which may render an abortion lawful, should be co-incident with the interests of her
foetus.").
268 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ. 1976); Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland,
[1993] A.C. 789, 789-90 (Eng. H.L.).
269 See Constance F. Fain, Wrongful Life: Legal and Medical Aspects, 75 Ky. L.J. 585,
630-31 (1987);Jackson, supra note 188, at 566-67; Pollard, supra note 215, at 358-59; Teff,
supra note 265, at 433-34; cf Harriton, (2006) 226 C.L.R. 52 at para. 95 (Kirby, J.,
dissenting).
270 See, e.g., Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 271 (1990)
("[Miost courts have based a right to refuse treatment either solely on the common-law
right to informed consent or on both the common-law right and a constitutional privacy
right."); see also id. at 278-79 ("The principle that a competent person has a constitution-
ally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred
from our prior decisions .... [We] assume that the United States Constitution would grant
a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition.").
271 See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
419 (Mass. 1977); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 651-52.
272 See Smith ex rel. Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 352-53 (N.H. 1986) (discussing the
difficulty in applying the traditional tort concept of objective harm to the inherently sub-
jective value of human life); see also Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Illusion of Autonomy at the End of
Life: Unconsented Life Support and the Wrongful Life Analogy, 45 UCLA L. REv. 673, 692-95
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plaintiff asks the court to prohibit artificial interference in the natural
process of dying. Absent such intervention, death will occur sooner,
and suffering will end. In a wrongful life claim, the court cannot put
the plaintiff in the desired position or in an economically equivalent
one.2 73 Natural reality limits the court's power. One can permit a
person to terminate his or her life, but one cannot place that person
in the position he or she would have been in but for birth. Finally, a
request for euthanasia, as opposed to a wrongful life claim, is not logi-
cally self-defeating.
c. Life Cannot Be Inferior to Nonexistence
One of the most common arguments against liability for wrongful
life, especially in American case law, is that the plaintiff cannot estab-
lish actual harm because life-even one of great suffering-is always
preferable to nonexistence. 274 In other words, the plaintiff's condi-
tion following the defendant's misconduct is indisputably and invaria-
bly preferable to the plaintiffs condition but for that conduct. For
example, in Berman v. Allan,2 7 5 the Supreme Court of New Jersey
abandoned the formal rationale of Gleitman ("the comparison is im-
possible") in favor of a value-based determination:
One of the most deeply held beliefs of our society is that life-
whether experienced with or without a major physical handicap-is
more precious than non-life .... No man is perfect. Each of us
suffers from some ailments or defects, whether major or minor,
which make impossible participation in all the activities the world
has to offer. But our lives are not thereby rendered less precious
than those of others whose defects are less pervasive or less
severe.
276
(1998) (observing that wrongful life cases "contain no equivalent exercise of patient
autonomy").
273 See Gleitman ex rel. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967), abrogated by
Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); cf Walker ex rel. Walker v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 741
(Ariz. 1990) (summarizing other states' inability to ascertain general damages in wrongful
life actions).
274 See Kearl, supra note 79, at 1279-80 (arguing that the majority in Turpin "rejected
one rationale for denying wrongful life recovery that had been adopted by numerous other
courts-that the plaintiff has suffered no legally cognizable injury because 'considerations
of public policy dictate a conclusion that life-even with the most severe impairments-is,
as a matter of law, always preferable to nonlife'" (quoting Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954,
961 (1982))).
275 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979).
276 Id. at 12-13; see also Blake ex rel. Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 321-22 (Idaho 1985),
superseded by statute, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-334 (West 2004), as recognized in Vanvooren v.
Astin, 111 P.3d 125 (Idaho 2005); Cowe ex ret. Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630,
635 (Ind. 1991); Bruggeman ex rel. Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d 635, 642 (Kan. 1986);
Kassama v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1123 (Md. 2002); Azzolino ex rel. Azzolino v. Dingfelder,
337 S.E.2d 528, 532-33 (N.C. 1985); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924-25 (Tex.
1984).
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The absolute preference for life in the wrongful life context de-
rives from the general principle of the sanctity of life. In the hierar-
chy of human interests, life is the most important. In the legal arena,
its importance manifests, inter alia, in the existence of a constitutional
right to life2 77 and in the imposition of the gravest punishments for
offenses of taking life. 278 Furthermore, the principle of the sanctity of
life is indiscriminative-it applies equally to all. The lives of all
human beings have equal intrinsic value and deserve maximum pro-
tection irrespective of the subjective quality of each life and the socie-
tal benefit generated by its protection. 279 If life is priceless and
sacrosanct, its existence must always be preferable to nonexistence.
Under all circumstances, "it's a wonderful life." Consequently, ac-
cording to this argument, wrongful life claims must be categorically
rejected.
The first critique of this line of argument is that the principle of
the sanctity of life is not truly absolute-in certain cases other inter-
ests supersede it.28° For example, recognizing a woman's liberty to
abort her fetus expresses a preference of her autonomy over the po-
tentiality of life.28 1 Acceptance of a euthanasia request also expresses
the preference for individual will over life.28 2 The abrogation of the
offense of attempted suicide by many jurisdictions is another example
of the qualified nature of the principle of the sanctity of life.28 3 Even
if, as concluded above, the liberty to abort and the right not to receive
medical treatment do not, as such, express a legal preference for non-
existence over life with disability, they do express the relativity of the
principle of the sanctity of life. If the principle is not absolute, it can-
not serve as the basis for a blanket rejection of wrongful life claims.
277 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2
(U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life .... ).
278 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.S. App. § 2A1.1 (2) (A) (LexisNexis 2007) ("In the case of premed-
itated killing, life imprisonment is the appropriate sentence if a sentence of death is not
imposed"); CAL. PEN. CODE § 190(a) (West 2006) ("Every person guilty of murder in the
first degree shall be punished by death, imprisonment in the state prison for life without
the possibility of parole, or imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 25 years to
life.").
279 See, e.g., Harriton ex rel. Harriton v. Stephens, (2006) 226 C.L.R. 52, paras. 259, 263
(Austl.) (Crennan, J.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2006/
15.html ("In the eyes of the common law of Australia all human beings are valuable in, and
to, our community, irrespective of any disability or perceived imperfection.... All human
lives are valued equally by the law when imposing sentences on those convicted of wrong-
fully depriving another of life.").
280 See Parker, supra note 235, at 669-70.
281 See id.
282 Id. at 670-71.
283 See Harriton, (2006) 226 C.L.R. 52 at para. 117 (Kirby, J., dissenting).
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I tend not to accept this critique. Without taking any stand on
the fierce battle between the pro-life and pro-choice movements, I
find it clear that abortion rights rest on the assumption that a fetus is
not a living person. So, in the eyes of pro-choice advocates, these
rights do not compromise the sanctity of human life. Additionally,
the right to forgo medical treatment and the impunity of attempted
suicide simply reflect the notion that people can waive their own
rights, including the right to life.
In any case, I think that we ought to reject the assertion that life is
invariably preferable to nonexistence for another reason, namely that
it is based on a comparison of two incomparable states. A court can-
not objectively compare life with disability to nonexistence because
the intrinsic value of life is a mystery-incapable of objective determi-
nation. The argument that life is always preferable to nonexistence is
necessarily subjective, value laden, and rooted in personal beliefs
(moral, religious, or other). It is not an objective argument based on
a scientific examination of reality. Just as a person can sincerely be-
lieve that life is always preferable to its absence, that person can be-
lieve with the same degree of internal conviction that, under certain
circumstances, nonexistence is preferable. Hence, the claim that ex-
tremely painful life is invariably preferable to nonexistence fails, not
because the reverse is necessarily true, but because we lack the exter-
nal data required for deciding between them.28 4
3. Possible Grounds for Allowing the Action
a. Life May Be Inferior to Nonexistence
Contrary to the prevalent view in American case law, the Supreme
Court of California arrived at a revolutionary conclusion in Turpin v.
Sortini,285 holding that there are circumstances in which nonexistence
is preferable to life: " [W] hile our society and our legal system unques-
tionably place the highest value on all human life, we do not think
that it is accurate to suggest that this state's public policy establishes-
as a matter of law-that under all circumstances 'impaired life' is
'preferable' to 'nonlife.' ,,28 6
284 See Kearl, supra note 79, at 1287-88 (arguing that no conclusion is possible in de-
ciding between life and nonexistence); cf Teff, supra note 265, at 433 ("Paradoxically, this
very premise logically entails the measurability in principle of non-existence ...
285 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982).
286 Id. at 962; see id. at 963 ("[W]e cannot assert with confidence that in every situation
there would be a societal consensus that life is preferable to never having been born at
all."); see also Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Empire Cas. Co., 713 P.2d 384, 393 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985),
rev'd, 764 P.2d 1191 (Colo. 1988); Dawe, supra note 159, at 496; Parker, supra note 235, at
671-72. The court in Turpin did not allow recovery for pain and suffering due to the
inability to answer the question of harm. 643 P.2d at 963-64. Yet it allowed recovery for
the extraordinary expenses related to the plaintiffs ailment. Id. at 965.
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Two of the five judges in the Israeli case of Zeitsov endorsed this
view. Justice Ben-Porat, with whomJustice D. Levin concurred, admit-
ted that the principle of the sanctity of life may make it seem that "any
kind of life, even if bound up with intense suffering and severe disabil-
ities, is invariably better than nonexistence. '" 287 Nonetheless, she con-
cluded that there are cases-albeit rare-in which a court can
determine that a person would have been better off not being born:
"Occasionally there is an accepted social presumption that a person
would have been better off not being born into a state of grave disabil-
ity."288 The criterion for determining the existence of harm is the
gravity of the congenital disability-only a particularly grave impair-
ment may lead to the conclusion that nonexistence is preferable to
existence, 289 so cases in which liability attaches will be exceedingly
rare.
290
This approach seems to raise a number of difficulties. Prima fa-
cie, the conclusion that life may be inferior to nonlife may uproot our
deep-seated commitment to the sanctity of human life. The Bundesger-
ichtshof noted the danger of assigning a negative value to human life
many years ago. In a seminal wrongful life case, it stated that given
the bitter experience of Germany under the unrestrained National
Socialist regime, "the practice of the courts in the Federal Republic
does not permit, with good reason, any legally relevant judgment
about the value of the lives of others."291 The great fear was that rul-
ing life with certain disabilities to be worse than nonexistence might
lead to the conclusion that people with those disabilities need not live
at all.2 92
I think this fear is somewhat exaggerated. There is a world of
difference between a situation in which the state, on its own initiative,
determines that nonexistence is preferable to existence for a particu-
287 CA 512/81 Zeitsov v. Katz [1986] IsrSC 40(2) 85, 95.
288 Id. at 96. Justice D. Levin also noted:
[I]n principle, the point of departure is that life, even when impaired, is
preferable to non-life. However[,J ... there may be cases in which a child's
defect is so grave that it may be said that "his life is not life" and that "it
would have been better for him not to have been born."
Id. at 126.
289 Cf Dawe, supra note 159, at 496 ("Rather than a nonrebuttable presumption that
no possible condition of life could be worse than nonexistence ... the court would adopt a
rebuttable presumption of preference for life.").
290 See Teff, supra note 265, at 437 ("[O] nly in extreme circumstances would a plaintiff
be successful in contending that he would have been better off not to have been born.").
291 English translation was taken from B.S. MARKESINIS, THE LAW OF TORTs: A COMPAR-
ATIVE ITrRODoucriON 149-50 (3d ed. 1997).
292 Cf McKay v. Essex Area Health Auth., [1982] 1 Q.B. 1166, 1180-81 (Eng. C.A.)
(Stephenson, L.J., concurring) ("To impose such a duty towards the child would . .. make
a further inroad on the sanctity of human life which would be contrary to public policy. It
would mean regarding the life of a handicapped child as not only less valuable than the life
of a normal child, but so much less valuable that it was not worth preserving.").
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lar person and a situation in which a person, out of free will, decides
that nonexistence is preferable to his or her life and premises an ac-
tion on that preference. Similarly, from the individual's perspective,
using the argument that life with serious disability is inferior to nonex-
istence to justify the violation of his or her personal interest (by dis-
crimination, imprisonment, or even elimination) differs significantly
from using such argument to improve that individual's condition by
awarding damages.2 93
All the same, any judicial expression of preference for nonexis-
tence over life with disability may offend the dignity of people suffer-
ing from physical or mental impairments, especially those who lead
satisfying and productive lives despite their disabilities.2 94 Addition-
ally, it may encourage intolerance toward the disabled.295 These con-
sequences are not only undesirable per se but also inconsistent with
express federal policy.29 6 I fear that the desire to compensate the suf-
fering child and dissatisfaction with the consultant's carelessness may
induce courts to accept wrongful life actions based on far-reaching
and unrealistic "societal presumptions." For example, in Azulai, an
Israeli court opined that there was a social convention to the effect
that a child born with Down syndrome would have been better off not
to have been born and that total blindness is a defect that makes non-
existence preferable to life. 29 7 Clearly, we may construe these value
judgments as an expression of society's negative attitude toward peo-
ple with disabilities.
Another possible critique of the Turpin approach is that it creates
a threshold below which there is no liability by distinguishing ex-
tremely severe and slighter disabilities. In case of a slight imperfec-
tion, the consultant will be altogether exempt from liability despite
293 Cf Harriton ex rel. Harriton v. Stephens, (2006) 226 C.L.R. 52, paras. 121-22
(Austl.) (Kirby, J., dissenting), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/
2006/15.html (observing that awarding damages does not demean or lower, but empow-
ers, the infant in the eyes of others).
294 See Edwards v. Blomeley, (2002) N.S.W.S.C. 460, para. 75 (Austl.), available at http:/
/www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/supremect/2002/460.html ("There are many dis-
abled members of society who lead valuable and fulfilling lives notwithstanding their signif-
icant physical handicaps. These citizens, by their achievements, are a source of inspiration
to others . . . . To all such persons the notion that non existence may be considered
preferable to living with disabilities would surely be perceived to be offensive."); Ellis v.
Sherman, 515 A.2d 1327, 1329 (Pa. 1986); Harriton, (2006) 226 C.L.R. 52 at para. 260
(Kirby, J., dissenting).
295 See Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions,
40 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 141, 144 (2005) ("Wrongful birth and wrongful life suits may
exact a heavy price not only on the psychological well-being of individuals with disabilities,
but also on the public image and acceptance of disability in society.").
296 See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
297 CC (Hi) 4993/90 Israel v. Azulai, [1991] IsrDC 5751 (2) 29, 34. However, the court
rejected the claim for damages in this particular case, saying of the plaintiff, "[H]er life is a
life, despite her disability." Id. at 34.
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having been careless. Additionally, many disabled persons will remain
uncompensated. The suffering of these people is admittedly less
acute, but it is unclear why we should deprive them of any compensa-
tion, albeit smaller. 298 I find this critique unacceptable. In cases of a
slight impairment, all agree that children are unable to contend that
their lives are inferior to nonexistence. Therefore, life with slight im-
perfections cannot constitute "harm" under the accepted meaning of
this term. In the absence of harm caused by carelessness, there can be
no liability even if the plaintiff is suffering and the defendant was neg-
ligent. The inner structure of tort law justifies a distinction between
extremely severe and slighter disabilities.
Even so, the Turpin approach must fail for the same reason set
forth with respect to the Berman line of argument. 299 The idea that
life under certain circumstances may be worse than its absence derives
from a comparison of two incomparable states. When a particular
judge holds that nonexistence is preferable to life with disability, that
decision relies on a subjective belief and not on objective facts. In
matters of belief, the judge's personal view is as legitimate as the con-
trasting beliefs of others. For example, millions of people all over the
world (among them a considerable portion of the American public)
believe that there is an afterlife at the end of life in this world. 300 For
these people, the claim that life with disability may be inferior to non-
existence is unacceptable because it totally ignores the afterlife. 301
The Babylonian Talmud relates that after Pharaoh had decreed that
every newborn Israelite son was to be cast into the river, Amram,
Moses' future father, divorced his wife to avoid procreation and others
followed his example. 30 2 His daughter reproached him, stating, inter
alia, that Pharaoh's edict only denied life in this world whereas
Amram's edict also deprived potential children of the World to
298 See Harriton, (2006) 226 C.L.R. 52 at para. 125 (Kirby, J., dissenting) ("In terms of
legal principle, minor injuries are not apprehended as categorically different from non-
minor injuries in ordinary personal injury cases. It is not apparent why such a distinction is
necessary as a disqualification in wrongful life actions."); CA 512/81 Zeitsov v. Katz [1986]
IsrSC 40(2) 85, 115 (Barak, J.).
299 See supra Part II.C.2.
300 Cf Francis A. Boyle, The Relevance of International Law to the "Paradox" of Nuclear
Deterrence, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1407, 1431 (1986) (observing that many people in the United
States military services believe in an afterlife).
301 See Edwards v. Blomeley, (2002) N.S.W.S.C. 460, 75, available at http://www.
austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/supremect/2002/460.html ("[T]here are many in society
who believe that the gift of life affords the opportunity for life after death and to all such
persons the notion that non existence may be preferable to life with disabilities, however
severe, is surely unacceptable.").
302 3 THE BAvLoNiAN TALMUD, Sotah 12a (Isidore Epstein ed., A. Cohen trans., 1948).
She also said that while Pharaoh's decree concerned only male babies, Amram's edict pre-
vented the birth of males and females. Id. Finally, she said that because Pharaoh was
wicked, there was doubt whether his decree would be fulfilled; because Amram was right-
eous, it was certain that his decree would be fulfilled. Id.
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Come. 303 This anecdote reflects the view that even life without any
pleasure that terminates in the cruelest fashion is preferable to nonex-
istence. Clearly, this belief is not shared by all, but its very existence
buttresses the claim that preference of nonbeing to a life of suffering
is not an objective determination. An objective judgment is impossi-
ble indeed.
The inability to compare disabled life with nonexistence gives rise
to another problem. The comparison between life and nonlife is nec-
essary not only to establish a cause of action but also to calculate dam-
ages. Tort damages aim to rectify the plaintiffs harm. 30 4 In a
wrongful life case, this means that the defendant must place the plain-
tiff in a position equivalent to nonexistence. Just as we cannot evalu-
ate nonexistence at the first stage, we are likewise unable to do so at
the second. Put differently, even if we were to accept the value-laden
opinion that nonexistence may be preferable to life with serious disa-
bilities, we would nonetheless be unable to determine the scope of
damages under those circumstances.
b. Redefining Harm
The attempt to resolve the question of harm has led us to a dead
end. I have shown that establishing harm is logically and practically
impossible, and that even if we were willing to make the necessary
(and in my view impossible) comparison, we would not reach a con-
clusive answer. Any comparison between life and nonlife would cata-
lyze a sharp dispute over the value of life, the settlement of which
requires adopting a subjective, value-based conviction. Still, the empa-
thy for the unfortunate child's suffering together with the disapproval
of the defendant's misconduct prompted noble attempts to circum-
vent these difficulties. 30 5 In the Israeli case of Zeitsov, Justice Barak
proposed the most radical solution, and Justice S. Levin concurred:
The doctor's notional duty of care requires him to exercise reasona-
ble care so that the minor's life will be unimpaired .... [The mi-
nor's] legally protected interest is not in nonexistence, but in life
without impairment. Accordingly, the harm for which the negligent
doctor is responsible does not lie in causing life or in preventing
nonexistence. The doctor is responsible for causing life with impair-
ment .... [The] assessment of damages need not take into account
303 Id.
304 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 156, at 164-65.
305 1 will not discuss in detail the attempt to evade these problems by separating special
and general damages and allowing recovery only for special damages under the RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 920 (1979). We must reject this approach, used by the Su-
preme Court of California in Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 964-66 (Cal. 1982), because it
confuses the question of harm (as a precondition for liability) with that of damages and
practically disregards the former.
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the state of nonexistence .... [The] doctor is responsible for caus-
ing a defective life, so the extent of the harm should be determined
by comparing impaired life and unimpaired life.30 6
Rather than comparing disabled life with nonexistence, the judge
should compare life with disability to life without disability.30 7 This
method seems to have a number of advantages. First, it enables the
suffering child to recover from the careless consultant. Second, estab-
lishing harm does not involve metaphysical questions nor is it based
on a value-laden, subjective preference. Third, assessment of damages
after liability has been established is no longer impossible but is simi-
lar to the assessment of damages in ordinary bodily injury cases.
Fourth, the proposed method does not distinguish between excep-
tional defects that may generate liability and other defects that may
not. It exempts the courts from excruciatingly difficult decisions in
borderline cases, and it prevents discrimination between differently
disabled persons with respect to the right of action and between negli-
gent consultants with respect to liability.
At first glance, this proposal seems to untie the Gordian knot of
wrongful life claims. However, closer examination reveals its manifold
weaknesses. First and foremost, this method does not comport with
fundamental principles of tort law.30 8 Harm is a detrimental change
in the state of a person that exists if the plaintiffs state following the
defendant's misconduct is worse than the plaintiff's state in the ab-
sence of that conduct. The only possible interpretation of this princi-
ple in a wrongful life claim is that the plaintiff must show that one's
life is inferior to nonexistence. The proposed comparison uses an
awkward legal fiction, an imaginary baseline, because the plaintiff
never had a chance of being born without disability. 30 9
Furthermore, tort law generally purports to compensate victims
for harms caused, not to punish tortfeasors. 3 10 Compelling the defen-
dant to put the plaintiff in a position that is economically equivalent
to normal life is not compensation for harm that the defendant
caused because normal life is evidently superior to the plaintiffs
306 CA 512/81 Zeitsov v. Katz [1986] IsrSC 40(2) 85, 116.
307 See Waller ex rel. Waller v. James, (2006) 226 C.L.R. 136, para. 39 (Austl.) (Kirby, J.,
dissenting), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2006/16.html
("Before this Court, counsel for the appellant contended that the appropriate 'compara-
tor,' if one was required, was an ordinary person without [the congenital disability].").
However, the court rejected this contention.
308 See KEETON ET aL., supra note 156, at 164-65.
309 Harriton ex rel. Harriton v. Stephens, (2006) 226 C.L.R. 52, paras. 269-70, 276
(Austi.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2006/15.html; see also
Zeitsov, [1986] lsrSC 40(2) at 89-90 (Ben-Porat, J.); Stolker, supra note 201, at 531.
310 Punitive damages are an exception, which is irrelevant in ordinary wrongful life
cases. Cf KEETON ET AL., supra note 156, at 9 ("The idea of punishment.., usually does
not enter into tort law . . ").
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pretort position (i.e., nonexistence). Justice Barak opined that the
principle of restitutio in integrum assumes that "if not for the wrong, the
victim would still exist, whereas in our case if not for the wrong the
victim would not exist. Consequently, damages should not aim to re-
store the status quo ante."'31 I find this unconvincing. The purpose of
tort damages is to restore the status quo ante. This is one of the most
basic features of tort liability without which tort law would not be tort
law. Courts cannot forego this principle ad hoc just because it is in-
convenient for certain plaintiffs.
Moreover, as a collective mechanism for regulating human con-
duct, tort law must not impose duties that cannot be fulfilled. Accord-
ing to Justice Barak's approach, the breached duty in a wrongful life
setting is the duty "to exercise reasonable care so that the minor's life
will be unimpaired."31 2 However, this is a duty that the consultant
could not fulfill because there was nothing the consultant could have
done to enable the child to be born healthy.313 Finally, the proposed
definition of harm raises a new problem on the causal relationship
level. The disparity between life with impairment and normal life,
which expresses the plaintiffs harm according to the proposed
method, did not stem from the consultant's carelessness. It was the
result of a hereditary defect, fetal exposure to dangerous factors not
imputable to the consultant's fault, or the like.
The critique of Justice Barak's approach from a public-policy per-
spective is less persuasive. One of the criticisms was that this approach
imposes liability even where the plaintiffs impairment is slight. If the
infant is born with a relatively minor physical impairment, it is im-
proper to determine that the defendant's conduct caused harm be-
cause the very same conduct has given the child life. Life with a
minor disability cannot be considered inferior to nonexistence. 31 4
Thus, recognizing a cause of action in cases of trivial impairments
seems "contrary both to public policy and the principle of the sanctity
of life."' 31 5 However, this argument ignores the fact thatJustice Barak
changes the baseline for comparison. He does not in any way assert
that life with disability, minor or grave, may be inferior to nonlife. He
merely states that normal life is preferable to life with disability. If we
accepted his revolutionary definition of "harm," recognizing the
child's harm would not be contrary to public policy.
Another criticism likewise relies on the fact that the proposed
method does not distinguish between minor and grave defects. Some
311 Zeitsov, [1986] IsrSC 40(2) at 117.
312 Id. at 116.
313 See id. at 100, 105 (Ben-PoratJ.).
314 See id. at 125 (D. Levin, J.).
315 Id. at 104 (Ben-PoratJ.).
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may argue that readiness to allow recovery for every less-than-perfect
life may open the floodgates of litigation. 31 6 Any person who is unsat-
isfied with a particular feature with which one was born might bring
an action against the consultants who failed to reveal it prior to birth.
For example, a right of action would be available for people born with
a tendency toward obesity or baldness, for those unsatisfied with their
height or eye color, and even for those born with lower-than-average
intelligence. The proposed method (as opposed to the Turpin ap-
proach) lacks any filtering mechanism, raising the specter of endless
litigation.
I find this fear unjustified. In a typical wrongful life case, the con-
sultant fails to discover the risk of a congenital disability or fails to
report it to the prospective parents, thereby preventing a decision to
avoid procreation. 31 7 I believe that most future parents would not un-
dergo examinations intended to reveal insignificant risks in the first
place (for either value-laden or economic reasons). Under these cir-
cumstances, the consultant would not be obliged to reveal and report
such risks. Even if future parents sought to ascertain the likelihood of
slight defects, it is doubtful whether knowledge of that possibility
would induce them to avoid procreation. This means that the causal
connection between the consultant's conduct and the ultimate
"harm" would be uncertain. Finally, assuming arguendo that the par-
ents would avoid procreation if they knew that their child would suffer
from a slight impairment, I do not think that failure to disclose that
risk could constitute actionable negligence. Negligence is the crea-
tion of an unreasonable risk, and the reasonableness of the risk
largely depends on the expected harm.318 When the expected harm
is minuscule, it is difficult to find an unreasonable risk.
D. Causation
1. Causal Relation Between the Negligence and the Disability
Opponents of liability for wrongful life may argue that the disabil-
ity for which the action is brought does not flow from the defendant's
substandard conduct but from factors outside the defendant's control,
such as heredity, chromosomal aberration, or a pathological disorder
in the pregnant woman's amniotic sac.3 1 9 Consequently, the required
causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the plain-
316 See id. at 106.
317 See Berenson, supra note 2, at 895-97.
318 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 156, at 164-65.
319 Cf Berenson, supra note 2, at 895-97 (describing a common wrongful life case
involving genetic counseling).
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tiff's harm does not exist. The Cour d'appel de Paris used this argu-
ment, which the Cour de cassation later rejected, in the Perruche case. 320
This argument reveals a misunderstanding of the subject under
discussion. Wrongful life plaintiffs do not contend that they would
not have been disabled but for the defendant's negligence, but rather
that they would not have been born. The causal connection required
in tort law is between the defendant's misconduct and the plaintiffs
harm, and the harm in wrongful life cases-if one can truly speak of
harm-is the shift from nonexistence to life with disability, not the
actual creation of the disability. Where it is clear that the parents were
legally capable of and factually inclined to avoid procreation had they
been aware of the true risk, one can say that the defendant's miscon-
duct caused the "harm" because without it, the plaintiff's life (with the
congenital disability) would have been avoided altogether.3 2 1
2. Causal Relation Between the Negligence and Life
a. The Right to Abort and the Right to Prevent Conception
At the outset, I differentiated between two kinds of wrongful life
claims. One relies on preconception negligence and the other on
postconception negligence. This distinction is critically important in
terms of causality. A crucial question in wrongful life (and wrongful
birth) actions stemming from postconception negligence is whether
the plaintiff's mother was permitted to abort the child, for otherwise it
is impossible to claim that the child would never have been born but
for the defendant's negligence. 322 Put differently, if the law does not
recognize the liberty to abort a disabled fetus, there is no causal con-
nection between the consultant's negligence and the child's life of
suffering.3 23 If there is no alternative of nonexistence, the basic pre-
condition of liability is not met.
The question of the liberty to abort when neither the pregnancy
nor the birth involves any danger to the future mother is indeed com-
plex and controversial. There are currently three approaches to this
issue in Western jurisdictions. The first absolutely prohibits, for moral
or religious reasons, abortions that are unnecessary to save the
320 See Cour de cassation, Premiere chambre civile [Cass. le civ.] [highest court of
ordinaryjurisdiction, first civil chamber] Mar. 26, 1996, Bull. civ. I, No. 156, pp. 109-10; see
also McKay v. Essex Area Health Auth., [1982] 1 Q.B. 1166, 1178 (Eng. C.A.) (Stephenson,
L.J., concurring).
321 See Douglas E. Peck, Azzolino v. Dingfelder: North Carolina Court ofAppeals Recognizes
Wrongful Birth and Wrongul Life Claims, 63 N.C. L. REV. 1329, 1339 (1985); Teff, supra note
265, at 430 n.37.
322 See Hummel ex rel. Hummel v. Reiss, 608 A.2d 1341, 1345-47 (N.J. 1992).
323 See id.
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woman's life. 324 States that impose blanket prohibitions on abortions
effectively bar any action premised on the claim that, but for negli-
gence, there would have been an abortion.
The second approach does not recognize a general right of abor-
tion but permits termination of pregnancy in certain statutorily de-
fined circumstances, usually within a certain time and under certain
procedural constraints. The list of circumstances in which abortion
may be acceptable is closed and without basket provisions. However,
it normally includes the situation in which cogent reasons support the
assumption that the child would suffer from a serious irremediable
disability. 325 The other alternatives pertain primarily to the physical
and mental welfare of the pregnant woman. 326 In those countries, a
plaintiff can argue that if the consultant had revealed and reported
his or her disabilities on time, the plaintiffs mother would have
aborted.
The third approach recognizes a woman's absolute right to termi-
nate her pregnancy, at least until a certain stage of gestation. For ex-
ample, in the well-known case of Roe v. Wade,3 2 7 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a pregnant woman has an absolute right to abort a
fetus during the first trimester of her pregnancy and even after that
(but prior to fetal viability) the state can only regulate abortion in
ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. 328 Subsequent to
viability, states may regulate and even proscribe abortion except
where it is necessary for the preservation of the mother's life and
health. 329 A woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viabil-
ity stems from the right to privacy, which the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees, or from the general protection of unspecified rights
under the Ninth Amendment. A similar view, with varying gestational
324 This seems to be the case in Ireland. See Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional
Norms from a "Wider Civilization": Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court's Use of Foreign and Inter-
national Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1324 n.180
(2004) (noting Ireland's general ban on abortion except where the pregnant woman's life
is at risk).
325 See, e.g., Abortion Act, 1967, c. 87, § 1 (1) (d) (Eng.); Penal Law, 5737-1977, [Special
Volume] LSI 85 (1978) (Isr.) (Section 316(a)(3) states that "[t]he [medical] committee
may, after obtaining the woman's informed consent, approve the interruption of preg-
nancy if it considers it justified on . . . the . . .ground[ that] . . . (3) the child is likely to
have a physical or mental defect.").
326 See, e.g., Abortion Act, 1967, c. 87, § 1 (Eng.); German Penal Code
(Strafgesetzbuch) § 218a; Penal Law § 316(a) (Isr.).
327 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
328 See id. at 164-65.
329 See id. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992), a plurality of the Court rejected the "rigid trimester framework" but affirmed the
essential holding" of Roe: a woman's right to have an abortion prior to viability, a state's
right to regulate or proscribe abortions subsequent to viability in order to protect its inter-
est in the potentiality of human life, and a state's interest from the beginning of the preg-
nancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus. Id. at 846, 878.
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limits, prevails in other countries. 3 °1 As long as the pregnant woman
has an absolute right to abort her fetus, the later-born child may argue
that if the consultant had revealed and reported the disabilities on
time, the mother would have aborted.
The parallel question in wrongful life (and wrongful birth) ac-
tions that focus on preconception negligence concerns the parents'
right to avoid conception by use of contraceptives, sterilization, or the
like. If contraceptives or sterilization procedures were prohibited, any
action of this kind would have to be dismissed in limine.3-' This issue
appears much simpler than the abortion issue and is definitely not as
controversial. However, this has not always been the case. In the past,
one could not take for granted the right to avoid conception (other
than by total celibacy), especially in legal systems that developed
under strong religious influence.
In the United States, for example, the Supreme Court first recog-
nized a right to use contraceptives in the mid-1960s. In Griswold v.
Connecticut,332 decided only eight years before Roe v. Wade, the Court
examined the constitutionality of a state statute that prohibited the
use of contraceptives. The Court ruled that this statute, when applied
to married couples, violated their constitutional right to marital pri-
vacy.3 33 Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,334 the Court analyzed
the constitutionality of a statute that prohibited individuals from sell-
ing, lending, transferring, or displaying contraceptives. As an excep-
tion to the prohibition, the statute permitted doctors to prescribe
contraceptives for married couples and pharmacists to supply contra-
ceptives in accordance with these prescriptions. -3 35 The Supreme
Court held that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by treating married and unmarried persons
differently. 336 The Court also opined that "[i]f the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fun-
damentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child. '3 37 To conclude, in the appropriate cases, one can claim that
one would not have been conceived but for the negligence of
another.
330 See Larsen, supra note 324, at 1320. As Larsen notes, however, "the United States is
one of only six countries in the world that allows abortion, without restriction as to reason,
until the point of viability." Id.
331 Cf Hummel ex rel. Hummel v. Reiss, 608 A.2d 1341, 1345-47 (N.J. 1992).
332 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
333 See id. at 484-86.
334 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
335 Id. at 441.
336 Id. at 443, 453-55; see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977)
(holding that the state cannot prohibit the sale of contraceptives to minors).
337 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
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b. The Expectant Parents' Discretion
An action in tort for wrongful life relies on the claim that the
plaintiff would not have been born but for the defendant's negli-
gence. Two assumptions premise this claim. First, the expectant par-
ents could have prevented the plaintiff's birth had they so desired. I
elaborated on this assumption in the foregoing subsection. Second,
had the parents known of the disability or its likelihood, they would
have decided to avoid conception or to terminate the pregnancy.
The nature of the expectant parents' decision had they possessed
the relevant information is of particular importance. 338 Should it
transpire that the parents would not have avoided procreation, it
would be impossible to impose liability on the consultant. 339 The par-
ents' decision would then be the proximate cause of the infant's birth
in a state of disability and would sever the causal connection between
the defendant's negligence and the plaintiffs "harm."340 If, on the
other hand, the parents' determination not to bring a disabled child
into the world was clear and unequivocal, the defendant cannot raise
the lack-of-causality argument. In fact, causation will not pose a prob-
lem even when there is no certainty with regard to the prospective
parents' decision if there is a better-than-even chance that they would
have avoided procreation. 34 1
Cases in which the parents seriously contemplated avoiding pro-
creation but in which it is impossible to show that there was a better-
than-even chance that they would have decided not to procreate seem
more problematic. In my view, courts may resolve such cases by a vari-
ation of the loss-of-chance doctrine.3 42 The likelihood that the par-
ents would have decided to procreate even if they had known about
the risk of congenital disability would not negate the child's right of
338 See Harriton ex rel. Harriton v. Stephens, (2006) 226 C.L.R. 52, paras. 177-81
(Austl.) (Hayne, J., concurring), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/
HCA/2006/15.html.
339 See Curlender ex rel. Curlender v. Bio-Sci. Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980).
340 See id.
341 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 236, § 433B cmt. a ("[Plaintiff]
must make it appear that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm.").
342 The loss-of-chance doctrine usually applies if a healthcare provider negligently fails
to reasonably minimize a preexisting risk. Under this doctrine, the plaintiff is compen-
sated for the extent to which the defendant's negligence reduced the plaintiffs chance of
achieving a better outcome. See GeorgeJ. Zilich, Cutting Through the Confusion of the Loss-of-
Chance Doctrine Under Ohio Law: A New Cause of Action or a New Standard of Causation, 50
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 673, 676 (2003); cf Joseph H. King,Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in
Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J.
1353, 1354 (1980) ("[T]he loss of a chance of achieving a favorable outcome or of avoiding
an adverse consequence should be compensable and should be valued appropriately,
rather than treated as an all-or-nothing proposition.").
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action (assuming that this right was not negated for other reasons).
However, such likelihood would factor into the assessment of
damages.343
III
A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A. Theoretical Foundations
As I endeavored to show in Part II, the only convincing reason for
denial of tort liability for wrongful life rests not on policy considera-
tions but on the internal conceptual boundaries of liability in tort.
The child's action will fail because of the logical and practical inability
to establish "harm" under the accepted meaning of that term. In a
wrongful life case, we are unable to compare the plaintiff's pretort
condition with the plaintiffs posttort condition because we cannot as-
sess the intrinsic value of life itself, which is absent in a state of nonex-
istence. Consequently, we are unable to determine whether the
pretort condition was preferable to the posttort condition. Moreover,
tort law aims to place the plaintiff in a position equivalent to the one
the plaintiff would have been in but for the defendant's misconduct.
Because we know nothing about nonexistence, the system cannot
achieve this goal. Furthermore, the plaintiff cannot logically aspire to
restore the status quo because turning the wheel back would not only
negate the plaintiffs physical entity but would also negate the plain-
tiff s legal personality together with any right to compensation.
In this Part, I contend that while tort liability for wrongful life has
been properly denied, it is possible and appropriate to allow recovery
within an alternative conceptual framework, which bears a greater cor-
relation to the child's real aspirations. In my view, the action should
be based on the claim that the defendant promised the plaintiffs par-
ents that, subject to specified uncertainties, the plaintiff would be
born without a certain defect and that the promise was not fulfilled.
The action's goal is to place the plaintiff, as closely as possible, in the
position the plaintiff would have been in had the promise been kept,
as in the celebrated case of Hawkins v. McGee.344
The proposed model focuses on the existence of an undesired
disability (in contradiction to the defendant's promise) rather than
on the existence of undesired life. It hinges not on an impossible
"443 I do not contend that this proposal necessarily fits with existing law in all states.
However, it may be a natural development of the law in jurisdictions that recognize the
loss-of-chance doctrine.
44 146 A. 641, 644 (N.H. 1929) (holding that the plaintiff could recover the differ-
ence between the value of a good hand and the plaintiffs disabled hand, given that a
doctor falsely promised the plaintiff that surgery would make the plaintiffs hand "a hun-
dred per cent good").
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comparison between life with disability and nonexistence but on the
comparison between life with a certain disability and life without it.
Undeniably, the plaintiff could not have been born healthy, so life
without disability cannot serve as the baseline for comparison in a tort
action for wrongful life. The only world in which the plaintiff would
not have been born disabled is the one sketched out by the defendant.
The idea of failure to keep a promise pertaining to a state of affairs
leads us quite naturally to the realm of contract law.
The attempt to delineate the borders between tort law and con-
tract law raises considerable difficulties. Most of the defining features
that scholars traditionally relied on to differentiate the two branches
of law seem insufficient. For example, some might argue that the dif-
ference rests on the origin of the obligation. In contract law, obliga-
tions are undertaken voluntarily, whereas in tort, obligations are
imposed by law irrespective of the parties' consent.345 This distinc-
tion, however, is not entirely complete. On the one hand, the court
may impose obligations not explicitly agreed on by the parties (or an-
nul obligations that were agreed on) in contract as well as in tort.346
This occurs, inter alia, when a court supplies contractual terms-espe-
cially on the basis ofjustice 34 7-or modifies an agreement based on
abstract principles such as the duty of good faith 348 or public policy.
349
Similarly, certain contracts implicitly incorporate statutory rights that
cannot be waived irrespective of the parties' true will.3 50 Occasionally,
a dominant party unilaterally determines the contents of the contract
without any real weight given to the wishes of the opposing party (as is
usually the case with standard contracts).351 On the other hand, vol-
untariness seems to play a significant role in modern tort law. For
example, voluntary assumption of responsibility is a crucial factor in
establishing a duty of care with regard to negligent omissions352 or
purely economic loss. 353
345 See TRINDADE & CANE, supra note 158, at 8.
346 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.5, at 346 (3d ed. 1999).
347 See id. § 7.16, at 500 (discussing how courts use "basic principles of justice" to fill
gaps in contracts).
348 See id. § 7.17, at 504 ("Courts have often supplied a term requiring both parties to a
contract to exercise what is called 'good faith' or sometimes 'good faith and fair
dealing[ ]' . . . .').
349 See id. §§ 5.2-5.4, at 326-43 (discussing generally the policies courts have devel-
oped to modify contracts on grounds of public policy).
350 See, e.g., MIcH. COMP. LAWS §§ 418.815, 421.31 (West 1999) (creating nonwaivable
rights in the Worker's Disability Compensation Act and in the Employment Security Act).
351 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 346, § 4.26, at 297-303 (discussing various judicial re-
sponses to standard form contracts).
352 See CLERK & LINDSELL, supra note 182, at 4, 310-13.
353 See id. at 343-44; Christopher Harvey, Economic Losses and Negligence-The Search for
a Just Solution, 50 CAN. BAR REv. 580, 600, 616, 620 (1972).
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One might argue that the distinction between tort law and the
law of contracts pertains to the notion of consideration. A person as-
sumes a contractual obligation in exchange for a valuable considera-
tion, whereas the law imposes a tort obligation on persons who have
not received anything in return.3 54 However, that distinction is some-
what limited because nominal consideration may be sufficient to cre-
ate an enforceable contract in many jurisdictions 355 and certain types
of undertakings are binding even without any consideration. 356
One could also argue that contractual rights and correlative du-
ties stem from the initial interaction between the parties, whereas
rights and duties in tort law can exist between two parties who were
strangers to one another prior to the occurrence of harm. 357 This
distinction is also deficient. A contract for the benefit of a third party
may confer rights on a person who did not communicate with the
party that owes the correlative duty.3 58 At the same time, the intensity
of the pretort interaction between the two parties may be significant
in establishing a duty of care in negligence. 359
It seems to me that the most substantive and fundamental distinc-
tion between the two branches of law is the functional distinction:
"[Many] contractual obligations are 'productive' in the sense that they
are obligations to produce advantageous outcomes, whereas the law of
torts is predominantly 'protective' in the sense that the obligations it
imposes are usually obligations to avoid disadvantageous
outcomes."' 60
More precisely, tort law and the law of contracts deal with differ-
ent types of bilateral interactions. Tort law deals with interactions in
which one of the parties detrimentally changes the position of the
other.36' Contract law, on the other hand, deals with interactions in
which at least one of the parties promised something to the other and
in so doing created an expectation that did not formerly exist.362 A
person found liable in tort is required to place the victim in the posi-
tion the victim would have been in but for the interaction between
354 See TRINDADE & CANE, supra note 158, at 8.
355 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 346, § 2.11, at 69-72.
356 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 82-94 (1981).
357 See TRINDADE & CANE, supra note 158, at 7-8.
358 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 346, § 10.7, at 692-94.
359 Many common-law jurisdictions condition liability in negligence on pretort prox-
imity. See, e.g., CLERK & LINDSELL, supra note 182, at 282-84; ALLEN M. LINDEN, CANADIAN
TORT LAW 268-71 (7th ed. 2001).
360 TRINDADE & CANE, supra note 158, at 7-8.
361 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 156, at 6.
362 Cf CLERK & LINDSELL, supra note 182, at 5 (contrasting the functions of contract
and tort).
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them. 363 A person found liable in contract must place the other party
in the position the latter would have been in had the latter's expecta-
tion, which was the product of their interaction, been realized.
364
This distinction between these two branches of law dictates the
appropriate solution for the wrongful life challenge. Plaintiffs cannot
expect a remedy that places them in a position they would have been
in but for the defendants' substandard conduct. A plaintiff can, how-
ever, aspire to be placed as closely as possible to the position that the
defendant promised he or she would occupy. Hence the proper con-
ceptual framework for the action is contractual.
3 65
Still, realizing that contract law is the appropriate conceptual
framework for the child's action is only the first stage of the analysis. I
must now show that the abstract notion can don a concrete legal garb.
In my view, the legal formulation of the child's action would be that
the consultant breached a contract for the benefit of a third party (the
plaintiff) concluded between the consultant and the plaintiffs parents
in which the consultant warranted that the plaintiff would not be born
with a particular disability.366 This claim derives from two doctrinal
arguments that require further examination. First, within the contrac-
tual relationship between the consultant and the parents, the former
guaranteed the accuracy of the representation made in the perform-
ance of the contract. Second, the contract between the consultant
and the parents is for the benefit of a third party, namely the child
whose birth occurred after the parties concluded the contract.
B. Substantiating the Doctrinal Arguments
1. Commitment to the Accuracy of the Representation
a. The Source of the Duty
The first question to address stems from the nature of the obliga-
tion under discussion. Clearly, the contract between the consultant
and the parents includes an implied duty of the consultant to provide
363 Expectation occasionally provides a basis for damages in tort. For example, a per-
son liable for interference with a contract must compensate the plaintiff for "the pecuniary
loss of the benefits of the contract." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 238, at
§ 774A(1)(a). However, in these cases the expectation did not stem from the interaction
between the plaintiff and the defendant. Rather, it existed irrespective of that interaction
and, as such, formed part of the status quo that tort law protected.
364 See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 346, § 12.8, at 784; R.D. Taylor, Expectation, Reli-
ance, and Misrepresentation, 45 MOD. L. REv. 139, 140 (1982).
365 One could argue that misrepresentation law may protect the expectation interest.
See Michael B. Kelley, The Rightful Position in "Wrongful Life" Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 505,
549-56 (1991). In my view, this constitutes an unwarranted extension of tort law.
366 The consultant's warranty does not relate to any disability, only to the specific de-
fects that the consultant promised to reveal. For example, if the prospective parents re-
quested that the consultant examine the risk of Tay-Sachs disease, the consultant would
not be liable for the birth of a child suffering from a polycystic kidney disease.
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prenatal consultation according to accepted standards of expertise
and care.367 However, even though this implied duty doubtlessly
exists and even though one can rarely dispute its breach in a wrongful
life setting, its existence and breach cannot benefit the plaintiff for a
simple reason. The breach of the contractual duty of care consists of
the consultant's negligence in providing medical or quasi-medical ser-
vices. Were it not for the breach, the parents would have received
accurate information that would have changed their decision with re-
gard to procreation, and they would not have given birth to the plain-
tiff. Following the breach of the contractual duty, the parents
received inaccurate information and decided to bring the child into
the world. The "harm" caused to the child by the breach of contract is
the same "harm" that forms the bone of contention in a tort action-
the disparity between life with disability and nonexistence. 3 6 So the
violation of the contractual obligation to exercise reasonable care
does not solve the problem.
The solution that I propose is based on an additional contractual
obligation-an assurance of the accuracy of the representation con-
cerning the potential child's state of health, which was ultimately
found erroneous. In my opinion, this obligation derives from the con-
tract between the consultant and the plaintiff's parents. Undoubt-
edly, the consultancy contract intended to provide the prospective
parents with accurate and reliable information on which they could
base their decision. The parents went to the consultant for definite
information and not for speculative advice. They would not have vis-
ited the consultant in the first place had they not assumed they would
receive accurate information. They would not have relied on the con-
sultant's statement unless they had been convinced of its accuracy.
The consultant plainly knew that the plaintiffs parents would make a
fateful decision relying on the accuracy of the statement. The mutual
understanding that the statement conforms to reality goes to the root
of the contract-without some kind of commitment to its accuracy,
the contract is futile. So we may say that the contract contains an
implied warranty that the consultant's statement is true,3 6 9 subject to
certain qualifications to be specified below.3 70 Arguably, the assur-
367 See, e.g., Hegyes v. Unjian Enters., Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 93 (Cal. App. 1991)
("[T]he doctor impliedly warrants competency...."); FARNSWORTH, supra note 346, § 7.17,
at 509 (observing that a professional usually has a duty to make reasonable efforts).
368 See Rubin ex rel. Rubin v. Hamot Med. Ctr., 478 A.2d 869, 872 (Pa. Super. 1984)
(rejecting the plaintiffs contractual wrongful life claim because it alleged the same harm
that tort law protected against).
369 The implied warranty may stem from the actual expectations of the parties, "an
objective test of whether one party should reasonably have known of the other's expecta-
tion," or "basic principles of justice." FARNSWORTH, supra note 346, § 7.16, at 499-500.
370 See infra Part III.B.1.
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ance of accuracy may also derive from the duty of good faith to the
extent that courts use this duty to protect the spirit of the contract. 371
The idea that one who provides information to another may be
bound by one's representation, at least after the recipient has relied
on it, is not in itself novel. A striking example appears in the law of
estoppel. Under the ancient doctrine of equitable estoppel (also
known as estoppel in pais), a person who made a representation of fact
with a reasonable expectation that the addressee would rely on it is
precluded from alleging or proving facts that contradict that repre-
sentation. 372 Insofar as the estopped party's representation binds that
party, the other party is placed in the position that he or she would
have been in had this representation been true. Even though this out-
come resembles the one we wish to attain in the matter under discus-
sion, the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply here because
the child's action is not in any way based on the argument that the
child has no disability.
A more pertinent manifestation is the concept of warranty in the
law of contract. "A warranty is an assurance by one party to a contract
of the existence of a fact upon which the other party may rely."
373
Clearly, such an assurance may be included in the contract explic-
itly.37 4 However, it may also derive from express or implied represen-
tations of fact, as is frequently the case where one party makes a
representation that induces the other to enter the contract. 375 In En-
gland, courts reached a similar result through the collateral (or ancil-
lary) contract theory. 376  When a contracting party made a
representation that did not appear in the ultimate contract but which
induced the other to enter the contract, courts occasionally ruled that
the representation was included in a preliminary contract, ancillary to
the primary contract, on the basis of which the primary contract was
formed. The ancillary contract thereby guaranteed the accuracy of
the relevant precontractual statements. 377
371 See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666, 672 (1963) ("Good faith perform-
ance has always required the cooperation of one party where it was necessary in order that
the other might secure the expected benefits of the contract. And the standard for deter-
mining what cooperation was required has always been an objective standard, based on the
decency, fairness or reasonableness of the community .... ).
372 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 346, § 2.19, at 91-94; Silas Alward, A New Phase ofEqui-
table Estoppel, 19 HARv. L. REv. 113, 113 (1905); Taylor, supra note 364, at 143.
373 See Metro. Coal Co. v. Howard, 155 F.2d 780, 784 (2d Cir. 1946).
374 See, e.g., Carolet Corp. v. Garfield, 157 N.E.2d 876, 878-80 (Mass. 1959); CBS Inc. v.
Ziff-Davis Publ'g Co., 553 N.E.2d 997, 998 (N.Y. 1990).
375 See Steven Z. Hodaszy, Note, Express Warranties Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Is
There a Reliance Requirement ?, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 468, 468 (1991) (discussing U.C.C. § 2-313).
376 See, e.g.,J. Evans & Son (Portsmouth) Ltd. v. Andrea Merzario Ltd., [1976] 1 W.L.R.
1078, 1081 (Eng. C.A.).
377 See, e.g., id.
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The most interesting question, however, is whether a court may
find an implied warranty even when the representation was not made
prior to the formation of the contract but during performance, as is
the case in wrongful life settings. An illuminating insinuation exists in
the case of Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc.37Ts In that case, the
plaintiffs desired to build a house in Salt Lake City with a view over a
well-known valley.3 79 They hired the defendant to prepare a construc-
tion plan before they found a suitable lot.38 0 After finding a lot, they
asked the defendant to ascertain its suitability for the planned
house. 38 1 The defendant advised them that the lot was indeed suita-
ble for the construction of a house with the requested view, and they
consequently purchased that lot.38 2 After construction began, it
turned out that building the house as planned (with a view of the
valley) was impossible due to relevant zoning ordinances and restric-
tive covenants. 383 Construction ceased. 384
The Supreme Court of Utah held that, in advising plaintiffs that
they had selected a suitable lot for the purpose of the contract and
that they could properly place the house on it, the defendant war-
ranted that a certain state of facts existed that did not truly exist.3 8 5
Defendant's warranty was "analogous to that of one who warrants that
a ship has already arrived at a certain port, thereby promising some-
thing impossible if, in fact, the ship has not arrived. ' 386 The court
added that the warrantor, by making such a warranty, promised to pay
damages if the facts were not as warranted-it was in fact an undertak-
ing that the facts existed. 387 In other words, the court concluded that
based on the essence of the contract, the defendant warranted the
accuracy of the information that it gave to the plaintiffs during the
performance of that contract.3 88 If a warranty existed in Quagliana
where providing the information was not the central purpose of the
contract, such a warranty could also exist in the wrongful life setting
where providing accurate information is the underlying purpose of
the contract.
378 538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975).
379 See id. at 303.
380 See id.
381 See id.
382 See id.
383 See id. at 304.
384 See id. at 303-04.
385 See id. at 309.
386 Id.
387 See id.
388 See id.
2008] 387
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
b. Limits of the Duty 8 9
As a rule, an implied contractual term must comport with the
parties' reasonable expectations or with the essence of the agree-
ment.390 For this reason, the consultant's warranty of the accuracy of
the representation cannot be unqualified.
Both parties are aware that the consultant's foresight is limited.
The level of accuracy that the consultant may provide depends, for
example, on the degree of scientific and technological progress, on
inherent uncertainties in medical and quasi-medical tests, and on the
limitations of human cognitive and analytical abilities. The consultant
knows of some of these limitations and may disclose them to the ex-
pectant parents. To the extent that the consultant does so, the con-
sultant explicitly changes the prospective parents' legitimate
expectations, thereby qualifying the warranty and absolving himself or
herself from any liability for inaccuracies deriving from such limita-
tions. Yet a consultant who fails to do so implicitly assures the parents
of the accuracy of the representation even when a mistake stems from
those constraints.
On the other hand, factors of which the consultant is not and
should not be aware at the time of consultation may also lead to mis-
taken conclusions. Assurance of the accuracy of the representation
relies on the assumption that such factors do not actually exist. The
reasonable consultant would not give an unqualified undertaking that
an opinion is free of all mistakes if the consultant were aware of fac-
tors liable to impair its accuracy. Similarly, the expectant parents un-
derstand that the consultant's assurance is subject to reasonable
presumptions about the degree of accuracy that can be reached in
medical or quasi-medical consultancy. Refuting these presumptions
removes the basis of the assurance itself. The conclusion is that the
warranty does not apply where it transpires ex post that the mistake
resulted from factors that the consultant, and those from whom the
consultant received assistance (such as laboratory workers or techni-
cians), did not know and should not have known when providing
consultation.
Assume, for example, that the defendant performed a test or
used equipment that the consultant and the scientific community con-
sidered reliable at the time of the consultation but which proved unre-
liable following scientific and technological developments. A
reasonable consultant would not have guaranteed the scientific valid-
ity of the examinations performed, or the reliability of equipment,
beyond the time of consultation. The expectant parents were also
389 See supra note 366 and accompanying text.
390 See supra note 369 and accompanying text.
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aware that the accuracy of the information that they received was sub-
ject to the scientific and technological limitations existing at the time
of the consultation. The warranty of accuracy is based on the assump-
tion that the examinations and the equipment are indeed reliable. If
it transpires ex post that the presumptions were erroneous and that this
was the cause of the consultant's mistake, then the warranty does not
apply.3 9 ' Still, the fact that the particular consultant has been una-
ware that the examinations or the equipment were not reliable at the
time of consultation will not always limit the warranty because a rea-
sonable consultant must keep abreast of scientific and technological
discoveries and innovations pertaining to one's area of expertise.39 2
Accordingly, where the consultant is unaware of the limitations of the
examination or the equipment due to the consultant's own negli-
gence, the qualification does not apply, and an action based on the
warranty could succeed. - 9
391 A similar qualification applies in products liability law under the state-of-the-art
defense. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d, (1998)
("[T]he test is whether a reasonable alternative design would, at reasonable cost, have
reduced the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product and, if so, whether the omis-
sion of the alternative design by the seller or a predecessor in the distributive chain ren-
dered the product not reasonably safe."); David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the
"Strict"Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 782-84 (1996) (explaining the use
of the "state of the art defense" in products liability cases).
392 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 236, § 299A (" [O]ne who under-
takes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise the
skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good
standing in similar communities."); Laura D. Seng, Legal and Regulatory Barriers to Adequate
Pain Control for Elders in Long-Term Care Facilities, 6 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 95, 104 (2003)
("[P]hysicians have an affirmative duty to remain updated on continuing developments in
their field of practice.").
393 Since the consultancy contract is based on the assumption that the consultant
knows or should know of sources of uncertainty, the claim that a mistake resulted from a
factor that the consultant did not know and should not have known at the time of consulta-
tion is a defense that the consultant must prove. One may argue that enabling plaintiffs to
recover without having to prove the defendant's negligence confers on them an advantage
that the law does not customarily confer on plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases. How-
ever, this argument overlooks two important facts. First, courts frequently shift the burden
of proof of substandard conduct in ordinary medical negligence cases from the plaintiff to
the defendant through the principle of res ipsa loquitur ("the thing speaks for itself"). See,
e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 689 (Cal. 1945) ("Without the aid of the [res ipsa
loquitur] doctrine a patient who received permanent injuries of a serious character, obvi-
ously the result of some one's [sic] negligence, would be entirely unable to recover .. ");
Anderson v. Somberg, 338 A.2d 1, 5 (N.J. 1975) ("[W]here an unconscious or helpless
patient suffers an admitted mishap not reasonably foreseeable and unrelated to the scope
of the surgery ... those who had custody of the patient, and who owed him a duty of care
as to medical treatment ... can be called to account for their default. They must prove
their nonculpability, or else risk liability for the injuries suffered."). Second, the action
here is not an ordinary medical malpractice action; it concerns the breach of an assurance
of the existence of a certain state of affairs rather than the breach of an obligation to act in
a certain manner.
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2. Contract for the Benefit of the Unborn
So far, I have shown that the contract between the consultant and
the plaintiff's parents contains a warranty that the consultant's repre-
sentation with regard to the likelihood of the plaintiff's birth with dis-
abilities is correct. I must now demonstrate that this warranty can also
inure to the benefit of the child even though the child was not a party
to the contract and was not even alive at the time of its formation.
We must analyze the child's right on two levels of abstraction. On
the general level, we must ascertain whether a contract between A and
B can confer a right of action on C even where C's birth occurred
after the formation of the contract. On the concrete level, we must
examine whether the child-who was not a party to the contract-can
benefit from the consultant's warranty of accuracy.
We start with the general question. Recall that under traditional
common law, a child acquires legal personality upon live birth. 394
Consequently, a person not yet born at the time of the formation of a
contract cannot be a party thereto. For the same reason, a contract
may not confer any rights on a third party prior to birth. However,
this does not necessarily imply that a contract between A and B cannot
include a provision for the benefit of a third person whose birth will
take place only after the formation of the contract. Evidently, the
third party's right is contingent on birth and only crystallizes after the
third party comes into the world and acquires legal personality.
The English legislature explicitly recognized this possibility
within the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act,395 which came into
force at the end of 1999. This Act heralded a revolution in English
law by recognizing the power of a contract to confer rights on a per-
son not party to the contract.39 6 Section 1(3) explicitly relates to the
status of a person who did not exist at the time of the formation of the
contract. It provides that, to acquire rights under the contract, a non-
party "must be expressly identified in the contract by name, as a mem-
ber of a class or as answering a particular description, but need not be
in existence when the contract is entered into."397 Even persons who
did not exist at the time that the parties formed the contract, such as
an unincorporated company or an unborn child, may acquire rights
under the contract after they come into existence.
The law in the United States has been similar to the current state
of the law in England for decades. The fact that the parties did not
know the identity of the third-party beneficiary when the contract was
394 SeeJost, supra note 158, at 634.
395 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999, c. 31 (Eng.).
396 Prior to this Act, the rule was that only contracting parties could base a claim on
the contract. See Tweddle v. Atkinson, (1861) 121 Eng. Rep. 762, 764 (Q.B.).
397 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act § 1(3).
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formed is immaterial.3 98 Arguably, this should also be the case if the
contracting parties did not know the beneficiary's identity because the
beneficiary did not exist at the time of the contract's formation. It
follows that a contract for the benefit of a third party may ultimately
confer rights on a person who was not yet born at the time of the
contract's formation. However, these rights are contingent on the
beneficiary's birth because rights cannot be conferred on someone
who lacks legal personality. 3
9 9
American case law provides at least two examples of contracts that
may confer rights on minors born after their formation.4 1g The first is
a surrogate-parenting agreement. In the famous In re Baby "Am"
40 1
case, Mr. and Mrs. Stern and Mrs. Whitehead concluded such an
agreement. Under its terms, Mrs. Whitehead was to be inseminated
with Mr. Stern's semen, carry the child to term, and relinquish cus-
tody to the Sterns after delivery. However, Mrs. Whitehead refused to
give up the child following birth. The Sterns filed an action to en-
force the contract.40 2 The court held that the surrogate-parenting
agreement was valid and enforceable in principle, and that Mrs.
Whitehead had breached that contract by refusing to relinquish cus-
tody of the child. 4° 3 The main question was whether specific perform-
ance was appropriate under the circumstances, 494 and the court
answered affirmatively.4 05 Incidentally, the court held that a third-
party beneficiary need not exist at the conclusion of the contract. In
particular, although Baby M was not yet alive when the parties formed
the surrogate-parenting agreement, there could be no doubt that it
existed for the child's benefit insofar as it sought to "bestow life and
398 See 17A Am. JUR. 2D Contracts § 443 (2004); FARNSWORTH, supra note 346, § 10.3, at
679 ("[C]ourts have not required that the person to be benefitted be identified at the time
the promise is made.").
399 An individual with no legal personality cannot sue to enforce a breached contract
right. SeeJost, supra note 158, at 634 (explaining that "full legal capacity" does not attach
until one reaches the age of majority).
400 These examples do not provide an exhaustive list of the variety of contracts that
may confer rights on minors born after the formation of such contracts. For example,
several states recognize the concept of "covenant marriage." The children who benefit
materially and emotionally from these covenant marriage contracts fall into the category of
"beneficiaries." See, e.g., Katherine S. Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis
and Legal Implications, 59 LA. L. REv. 63, 64-65 (1998).
401 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987), affd in part, rev'd in part, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J.
1987).
402 See id. at 1142-46.
403 See id. at 1166.
404 Under NewJersey law, specific performance is an equitable (discretionary) remedy.
See id.
405 See id. at 1175.
2008]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
provide for the child's best interests." 40 6 The child could thus seek
redress under the contract.40 7
Another type of contract that may confer rights on a person not
in existence at the time of the contract's formation is a contract for
the provision of medical or quasi-medical services to a woman who
intends to bring a child into the world so as to ensure that the child is
born healthy. The courts have consistently held that at least the con-
tractual duty to exercise due care in providing such services confers a
correlative right on the expectant mother and on the child who is
ultimately born as a third-party beneficiary. 40 8 A few examples will
suffice to demonstrate this point.
In Walker v. Rinck,40 9 a woman undertook blood tests during her
first pregnancy out of fear that she had Rh-negative blood. 4 10 The
tests erroneously showed that she had Rh-positive blood.4 1 1 Conse-
quently, she did not receive a substance intended to avoid the forma-
tion of harmful antibodies when a mother with Rh-negative blood
gives birth to an Rh-positive child at the time of the birth of her first
child. 412 In the aftermath, the woman gave birth to three children
with congenital defects who later filed suits against their mother's phy-
sician and the laboratory that performed the blood tests. 4 13 The court
explained that while the physician's duty to the patient arises from the
contractual relationship between them, the physician may also owe a
duty to a third party who benefits from the consensual relationship
where the professional has actual knowledge that the services pro-
vided are, in part, for that person's benefit. 4 14 The plaintiffs in this
case were the beneficiaries of the consensual relationship between
their mother and her physician, and the latter knew that the treat-
ment was intended to protect his patient's future children from being
injured in utero.41 5
406 Id. at 1171.
407 See id. at 1171-77; see also Barbara L. Keller, Surrogate Motherhood Contracts in Louisi-
ana: To Ban or to Regulate?, 49 LA. L. REv. 143, 166 (1988).
408 Several courts have held that the contract between the doctor and the mother may
confer additional rights on the child. For example, in Jones v. Jones, 144 N.Y.S.2d 820, 826
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955), the court stated that the child was a third-party beneficiary of the
mother-doctor prenatal-care contract and that the child could consequently enjoy the doc-
tor-patient privilege after birth. The court did not base its decision on this argument,
however, because the same doctor eventually treated the child following birth, thereby
making the child the doctor's patient for the purpose of the doctor-patient privilege.
409 604 N.E.2d 591 (Ind. 1992).
410 Id. at 592.
411 Id.
412 Id.
413 Id. at 592-93.
414 Id. at 594-95.
415 Id.; cf Carucci v. Maimonides Med. Ctr., 641 N.Y.S.2d 725, 727-28 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996) (Altrnan, J., dissenting in part) (holding under similar circumstances that the child
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In Hegves v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc.,4 16 a woman was injured in a
car accident. Two years after the accident, she conceived, but due to
injuries sustained in the accident, her child was born prematurely with
injuries related to the premature birth. 41 7 The child sued the em-
ployer of the driver who caused the accident. 41 8 Although the deci-
sion relating to the defendants' liability is not important here, the
court made some significant incidental remarks. It observed that the
doctor-patient contract contains an implied warranty of competency
in rendering medical care and advice. 41 9 When a doctor gives care
and advice to an expectant mother to ensure the birth of a healthy
child, the child is "tantamount to a foreseeable third-party beneficiary
of that contract" and as such, enjoys independent protection against
incompetent treatment or advice. 420
It is true that Walker and Hegyes dealt with the existence of a duty
of care in an action for negligence. Yet, the court's assumption in
both cases was that a contract between a woman and her doctor could
also confer rights on a child born after the contract's formation pro-
vided that the contract intended to protect an interest of the future
child.
This leads us to the concrete question: can the child in a wrong-
ful life setting seek redress on the basis of the consultant's warranty of
accuracy as a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the con-
sultant and the child's parents? A third party can acquire rights under
a contract if it can be shown that the contracting parties intended to
confer a benefit on that third party.42 1 Some courts have held that
intent to benefit the third party was insufficient and have required
intent to confer a direct right against the promisor, 422 but the prevail-
is akin to a third-party beneficiary of a contract arising out of the consensual relationship
between the mother and her doctor).
416 286 Cal. Rptr. 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
417 Id. at 86.
418 Id.
419 Id. at 93.
420 Id.
421 See, e.g., AgGrow Oils, L.L.C. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 420 F.3d 751, 755 (8th
Cir. 2005); Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 982 (11th Cir. 2005); Hamill v.
Md. Cas. Co., 209 F.2d 338, 340-41 (10th Cir. 1954); Sachs v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 148
F.2d 128, 130 (7th Cir. 1945); Paducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah Water Supply Co., 12 S.W.
554, 555 (Ky. 1889); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981) (explaining
that, in order to acquire rights under a contract as a nonparty, one must show that such a
ruling is "appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either (a) the perform-
ance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the benefici-
ary; or (b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the
benefit of the promised performance").
422 E.g., Colonial Disc. Co. v. Avon Motors Inc., 75 A.2d 507, 509-11 (Conn. 1950)
("[T]he ultimate test to be applied is whether the intent of the parties to the contract was
that the promisor should assume a direct obligation to the third party . ); Am. Pipe &
Constr. Co. v. Harbor Constr. Co., 317 P.2d 521, 526 (Wash. 1957).
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ing view is that intent to benefit suffices. 42 3 As in other cases, courts
may deduce the parties' intentions from the contract in its entirety,
construing it in light of the circumstances surrounding its forma-
tion.4 24 Obviously, where an explicit contractual provision attests to
the parties' intent to benefit a third party, the court will give effect to
that provision. However, the absence of such provisions will not pre-
vent third parties from proving that they were intended beneficiaries
of the contract.
The law in England is quite similar to the law in the United
States. In England, Section 1 of the Contracts (Rights of Third Par-
ties) Act 425 states that "a person who is not a party to the contract...
may in his own right enforce a term of the contract if (a) the contract
expressly provides that he may, or (b) . . . [if] the term purports to
confer a benefit on him," unless it appears-on a proper construction
of the contract-that "the parties did not intend the term to be en-
forceable by the third party."426 Under the Act, a third party may ac-
quire rights under the contract in the absence of an express provision
to that effect if there was an intent to benefit the third party. The Act
establishes a refutable presumption that the contracting parties in-
tended it to be enforceable by the third party if a contractual term
purported to benefit that third party.
It seems to me that under the intent-to-benefit test, the child may
have a contractual cause of action against the consultant. The con-
sultant's warranty as to the accuracy of the representation obviously
protects an important interest of the parents. It enables them to de-
mand, in appropriate circumstances, the neutralization of any discrep-
ancy between reality and the promised state of affairs. If the
consultant warranted that the mother would give birth to a healthy
child and this statement was mistaken, the consultant would have to
place the parents in a position equivalent to parenting a healthy
child. 427 Nonetheless, the warranty is also intended to serve the inter-
est of the future child. When the consultant promises the expectant
423 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 346, § 10.3, at 678-79.
424 See Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1712, 1770 (1997).
425 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999, c. 31 (Eng.).
426 Id. § 1(1)-(2) (emphasis added).
427 In principle, the parent could use this warranty in cases of a "reverse" mistake. If
the mother decided to terminate her pregnancy or to not conceive based on the consult-
ant's mistaken statement that her offspring would suffer from a certain defect, enforce-
ment of the warranty would put her in a position equivalent to motherhood of a defective
child. However, the mother's decision to avoid procreation effectively expresses her pref-
erence for nonparenthood over parenthood of an impaired child. This being the case, the
warranted position would make her worse off than her current position, so there is no
compensable harm. I assume, therefore, that under these circumstances, the mother
would prefer to bring an ordinary action in tort that would place her in the position that
she would have occupied if the consultant had not been negligent.
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parents that their child will not suffer from a specific defect, this
promise primarily, directly, and essentially concerns the state of the
child. 428 The consultant promises that the child will not have a disa-
bility. The promise with regard to the state of the parents is deriva-
tive. Accordingly, if the representation proves incorrect, the
consultant should have to place the child as much as possible in a
position similar to that which the child would have been in had reality
conformed to the representation.
Some may argue that parents seek the consultant's advice merely
for their own sake because the parents are only interested in the possi-
bility of having to bear the economic and emotional burdens involved
in rearing a disabled child. Consequently, under such an objection,
the consultant's warranty relates only to the position of the parents
themselves and not to that of their future offspring. But this distinc-
tion seems contrived. Prospective parents who seek prenatal or pre-
conception advice are not interested exclusively in their own
future.429 They are also, and primarily, concerned with their potential
child's health. Parents naturally wish the best life for their child and
want to ensure that their child will not live in constant pain. In addi-
tion, parents most likely do not want their child to cope with the
crushing knowledge that they would have preferred not to have
brought the child into the world had they known in advance what was
ultimately revealed. If the consultant promised that their child would
not suffer from a certain defect, then parents expect that promise to
be kept in full. The consultant for his part understands this very well.
Accordingly, if a disabled child is born, placing that child as much as
possible in the promised position is a substantive and integral part of
enforcing the warranty. We may thus say that the warranty is intended
to benefit both the child and the parents. So according to the Anglo-
American view, the child may enforce this warranty in his or her own
name.
4 30
C. Advantages and Disadvantages
We observed that in the typical wrongful life setting, the consult-
ant warrants the accuracy of his or her representation to the plaintiff's
parents. 43  The child, as well as the parents, may enforce that war-
428 Cf Hegyes v. Unjian Enters., Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 93 (Cal. App. 1991) ("[A]
woman who wishes to conceive and keep her child engages a physician .. . to ensure the
birth of a healthy infant. The latter consideration is uppermost in the minds of both a
woman and her doctor.").
429 See id.
430 A contract may meet the intent-to-benefit test even if the parties' intent was not
exclusively to benefit the third party, as the primary purpose of contracting parties is com-
monly to benefit themselves. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 346, § 10.3, at 679-80.
431 See supra Part III.B.
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ranty. This means that, if the representation is incorrect, the consult-
ant must place the child (and the parents) in a position that conforms
to the representation. True, the consultant's promise was that the
child would come into the world without a certain disability whereas
the child could not have been born healthy, and no one-including
the consultant-can cure the child after birth. We cannot oblige the
consultant to change reality, so as to make it conform to the state-
ment. Still, nothing precludes awarding expectancy damages that
would place the child in a position fairly equivalent to the one
promised. 43 2
This proposed model is clearly preferable to the Turpin ap-
proach. First, the child's cause of action does not rely on the impossi-
ble comparison between life with disability and nonexistence, which
the traditional model requires. Second, recognizing the child's right
does not necessitate a value judgment that may offend the dignity of
disabled individuals and of the plaintiff in particular. Third, the as-
sessment of damages is not an impossible task. Fourth, this proposed
model does not discriminate between children with varying kinds of
defects. Every child whose position differs from what the parents'
consultant promised receives damages. Fifth, when a consultant pro-
vides information to a pregnant woman, contractual liability does not
depend on the right to abort, which may, in certain legal systems and
under particular circumstances, bar an action in tort. Sixth, there is
no need to determine what the parents would have done had they
known the truth in advance. Thus, we avoid a perplexing, speculative,
and potentially vexing discussion. The warranty theory is also prefera-
ble to Justice Barak's approach in Zeitsov because it does not contra-
dict the most fundamental principles of the branch of law on which it
is based. 4 33
It would appear that the central deficiency of the proposed
model lies in its limited scope of application. The warranty theory
applies only to the first category of wrongful life cases, namely cases
where the plaintiffs parents decided to bring the child into the world
following the defendant's representation that their child would not be
disabled. This theory does not apply to cases like Speck v. Finegold in
which the parents, being aware of the risk of congenital disability,
wished to avoid procreation and the defendant was negligent in per-
432 See Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders, 538 P.2d 301, 309 (Utah 1975) ("By
making such a warranty [in the context of property] the warrantor promises to pay dam-
ages if the facts are not as warranted .... ."); see also Metro. Coal Co. v. Howard, 155 F.2d
780, 784 (2d Cir. 1946) ("[A warranty] amounts to a promise to indemnify the promisee
for any loss if the fact warranted proves untrue, for obviously the promisor cannot control
what is already in the past.").
433 See supra notes 306-18 and accompanying text.
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forming an act intended to prevent conception or birth.43 4 In these
cases, the defendant did not promise the parents a healthy child. The
consultant promised, at the very most, that no child would be born at
all. This takes us back to the starting point: is nonexistence (the
promised state) better than life with disability (the current state)? In
those cases, the fundamental difficulty that would arise in a tort action
would also arise in a contract action. Consequently, in the second
category of wrongful life cases, the child can recover neither in tort
nor in contract. The plaintiff must be content with an indirect benefit
from the parents' action for wrongful birth and with social-security
benefits where available. It appears, therefore, that two types of indis-
tinguishable cases are treated differently.
But this deficiency is facially apparent. The similarity between
the two categories exists merely from a tort-law perspective. The fac-
tual and legal arguments in a tort action for wrongful life may be the
same in both cases, so tort law should treat them equally. Yet, the
second category is undeniably distinct from the first from a contractual
perspective because only in the first category can one speak of a prom-
ise of a nondisabled child. This is a crucial distinction that justifies a
different outcome within the framework of contract law.
A stronger criticism of the proposed model is that it has limited
practical value because an express disclaimer can easily circumvent an
implied warranty. 4 35 However, categorically renouncing the warranty
seems highly unlikely. As explained above, the parents would not
have gone to the consultant had they thought that the consultant
would provide them with unreliable information. Including a dis-
claimer in the consultancy contract would simply render the consult-
ant unemployed, as no one would turn to a consultant who is not
committed to his professional statements.
Alternatively, a consultancy agreement could contain a provision
whereby the contract does not confer benefits or rights of any kind on
third parties. Still, potential parents will likely hesitate before turning
to a consultant who attempts to shirk any responsibility toward their
future child. It is true that parents would be more willing to accept
this than a categorical disclaimer of the warranty. However, one can-
not presume that potential parents would always agree to waive the
contractual protection of their future child's interests.
I believe, therefore, that one of two things may occur. The first is
that no consultant would insist on the above-mentioned provision be-
434 See Speck ex rel. Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 112-13 (Pa. 1981), superseded by
statute, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305 (West 2007).
435 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 346, § 2.20, at 101 (explaining that, in quasi contracts,
courts will only imply terms where the agreement of the parties does not resolve the
dispute).
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cause the costs (loss of clients to competitors) would exceed the bene-
fits (lower insurance premiums). The second, and more realistic,
possibility is that certain consultants would require such a provision
while others would not. Presumably, the fees of consultants that as-
sume an additional risk (an action by the future child) would be
higher. Under these circumstances, the expectant parents would have
to decide whether to protect the interests of their future child for an
additional cost by turning to a consultant who assumed the additional
risk or to waive such protection. If they pay the extra cost, their future
offspring will be able to enforce the warranty. If they do not, their
child will not be able to sue the consultant at all. Either way, this
result is a justifiable one because the risk of liability factors into the
consultancy fee. Where the parents waive the child's right as a third-
party beneficiary, the child can blame no one but the parents.
CONCLUSION
Part I showed that hostility to liability in tort for wrongful life is
almost universal, crossing lands and seas. Part II argued that this de-
murral is ultimately rooted in the absence of one of the central com-
ponents of the cause of action. A tort action must fail because of the
inability-both logical and practical-to establish "harm" under the
traditional definition of this term. Part III opined that since the Gor-
dian knot of tort law cannot be untied, it must be cut altogether. We
must replace the traditional tort framework, which gives rise to an in-
soluble problem, with a more promising contractual framework. In
my view, the child may base an action on the claim that the defendant
promised the parents that the child would be born without a certain
defect and that the promise went unfulfilled. In formal terms, the
child is an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract between
the parents and the consultant in which the latter warranted birth
without a particular disability. The warranty of the future child's phys-
ical integrity and health, an integral and inseparable part of the con-
tract, should form the basis of the child's cause of action. The main
advantage of the contractual theory is manifest-it does not depend
on a comparison between life with disability and nonexistence, which
spells the doom of the traditional framework, but rather on a compar-
ison between reality (life with disability) and the promised state (life
without disability). This shift is critical both in establishing liability
and in assessing damages.
The simplicity of the proposed solution, at least on the abstract
level, gives cause for amazement. How is it that to this day all inter-
ested parties have overlooked this solution? I dare say that this is pri-
marily the result of lawyers' intellectual conformism. Emphasis on the
consultant's negligent conduct and the ubiquitous tendency to pre-
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mise any action for a medical mishap on tort law in general, and the
tort of negligence in particular, channeled both the plaintiffs and the
courts into the realm of negligence law.43 6 They thus diverted their
attention from the unique features of the situation under scrutiny.
These features unquestionably add an extra dimension to the legal
relationship between the child and the consultant. But to the extent
that the dogmatic discourse became increasingly entrenched and long
lived, the chances of changing the focal point steadily, though regret-
tably, diminished.
,
Maybe life is wonderful in each and every case; maybe it is not worthwhile
at a certain time or place; no answer to this riddle can objectively be set; but if
you promise wondrous life, the promise should be kept.
436 See, e.g., Berenson, supra note 2, at 895 ("Traditionally, such claims simply would be
classified under the rubric of medical malpractice."); Pollard, supra note 215, at 342
("Wrongful life cases are grounded in medical malpractice .... "); Stolker, supra note 201,
at 525 ("The wrongful life claim is regarded ... as the frontier of medical malpractice
litigation.").
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